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Abstract: Extensive concerns over global warming caused by carbon emissions have promoted 
the world community to address this pressing environmental challenge. Using comprehensive 
international data, we examine how banks respond to borrowers’ carbon emission levels in their 
lending. Banks charge a higher loan spread and apply stricter non-price contracting terms to 
borrowers with larger direct carbon emissions, but not to those with indirect emissions. The effect 
is stronger if lenders are more committed to combating global warming, and becomes weaker if 
borrowers adopt better carbon governance schemes. Carbon emission’s impact on bank loans is 
mitigated in countries/regions with faster economic growth. Carbon intensive firms are associated 
with deteriorated profitability and heightened regulatory and bankruptcy risks, which potentially 
explain the tougher loan terms they face.      
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1. Introduction 
In the past decades, global warming has evoked tremendous concerns and widespread 
cooperations throughout the world. In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was initiated with the purpose to limit global temperature increases, 
mainly through reducing anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
(GHG) – the major contributors to global warming and climate change. Starting from 2008, legally 
binding emission reduction targets are implemented under the Kyoto Protocol. The Paris 
Agreement, adopted by the UNFCCC in 2015, further specifies a clear goal to limit the global 
average temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.1 According to the 
database maintained by the Grantham Research Institute and the Sabin Center, there are 1,260 
climate change-related laws covering 164 countries and regions in 2017, a 20-fold increase over 
the past 20 years (there were 60 laws in place in 1997).2 These actions from the international 
community have established an ever-expanding legislative network and general rhetoric of 
environmental awareness worldwide that have fundamentally changed the landscape of economic 
activities. 
The keyword of global warming is carbon emission, directly from the combustion of fossil 
fuels and indirectly from the consumption of products (e.g., electricity and heat) generated by 
GHG emitting facilities, corresponding to the Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, respectively, in the 
GHG Protocol.3 Carbon emission is distinct from the more narrowly defined substances like air 
and water pollutants and the more broadly defined social or environmental responsibility that have 
not called for the vast-scale collaborative responses throughout the whole international society.4 
                                                           
1 https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en. 
2 https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-climate-change-laws-around-world. 
3 https://ghgprotocol.org/.  
4 For example, air pollution has a much long history with notable evidence documented hundreds of years ago 
(http://environmentalhistory.org/about/airpollution/). In the modern era, the U.S. adopted the Clean Air Act and also 
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Carbon emission features global-wide influence because climate change is not confined within any 
geographical or jurisdictional boundaries, inducing a challenging externality problem. 
Economically, governmental efforts such as command-and-control, carbon tax, and cap-and-trade 
mechanisms aim at internalizing the emitters’ cost, and eventually reducing the total amount of 
carbon emission. The basic rationale is to, in various forms, penalize excessive emissions. 
Nevertheless, carbon mitigating arrangements are not equally applied across countries and regions, 
and local regulations are different in terms of coverage, stringency, and enforcement. As a result, 
the efficacy of the government-initiated carbon solutions is still under vigorous debates and is 
often criticized for lack of “teeth” (Storrow 2018).5 
The endeavors of the public sector, however, can give teeth to the private sector and the 
stakeholders therein to fight the war on carbon emission. Besides the penalties from the 
government, a corporate emitter, for example, can face ever-harsher punishments from its investors, 
creditors, suppliers, and customers. With global warming on their minds, these private 
stakeholders could abstain from investing in or financing the firm and its projects or charge a 
higher funding cost. They may attach additional screenings when providing supplies to or buy 
from the firm, even boycott its products. Notwithstanding the theories, how hard these teeth are is 
yet to be known. 
                                                           
established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, and passed the Clean Water Act in 1972. Corporate 
social responsibility has attracted attention from businesses since the 1960s (De George 2011). As a comparison, the 
carbon-focused international Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005 (with its first commitment period starting from 
2008) (https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol).  
5 For example, carbon prices have consistently been below expected range in the European Union (EU) Emissions 
Trading Scheme, suggesting that even in regions with tough climate policies such as the EU, the stringency of current 
governmental interventions is still below the levels many believe are required to trigger the necessary changes 
(Dechezlepretre, Lovo, Martin, and Sato 2017). The Clean Development Mechanism, established under the Kyoto 
Protocol to incentivize investment in climate-friendly technologies in developing countries, has also been shown to 
be flawed in its efforts to abate carbon emissions (Nature 2011). 
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In this paper, we investigate how financial institutions worldwide exercise influences on 
carbon-emitting corporations in their lending activities. Banks are the prominent private bodies 
that interact with firms’ carbon emissions. First, banks facilitate and provide significant amount of 
capital. The size of bank loans takes a great portion of the credit market and easily exceeds the 
scale of equity funding.6 Through lending, financial institutions are connected with almost all 
economic parties including some significant carbon emitters. The vast majority of a bank’s carbon 
footprint relates to its deals with the borrowers. Second, as private debt providers, banks have an 
informational advantage in understanding the operations and risk profiles of the borrowing firms. 
Banks are thus in a better position than other stakeholders when analyzing firms’ carbon-related 
activities and the consequent impacts (Aintablian, McGraw, and Roberts 2007). Third, the 
financial sector is among the first to establish its own management frameworks targeting at 
environmental and climate risks in project funding, in which inter-bank cooperation further gives 
the banking industry an edge on carbon vigilance. 7  Fourth, loan contracting is multi-facet, 
including both price and non-price terms (Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe 2000), which gives banks 
flexibility in their lending decisions and also provides richer information about the consequences 
of carbon emissions than that reveals in, say, the equity market. 
                                                           
6 By the end of 2017, the value of loans of all commercial banks in the U.S. amounted to US$ 12, 564 billion 
(https://www.statista.com/statistics/214283/bank-credit-of-all-commercial-banks-in-the-united-states-monthly/). The 
equity market raised US$ 44.2 billion in 2017 via initial public offerings 
(https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/deals/library/us-capital-markets-watch.html).   
7 For example, the Equator Principles as a risk management framework for environmental risk were formulated in 
2003 and now have been adopted by 93 financial institutions in 37 countries (http://equator-principles.com./about/). 
The Carbon Principles are established in 2008 by three leading banks (Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and Morgan 
Stanley) to assess the carbon risk in financing electric power projects 
(https://issuu.com/tobend/docs/the_principle_matter). The Climate Principles, adopted by Crédit Agricole, Munich 
Re, Standard Chartered, Swiss Re, and HSBC, are a similar framework for a response to climate change 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Carbon_Principles). In April 2018, 16 leading banks from four continents, 
convened by the United Nations Environment Finance Initiative, published a jointly developed methodology to 
increase banks’ understanding of how climate change and climate action could impact their business 
(http://www.unepfi.org/news/industries/banking/tcfd-recommendations/). 
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Economists have proposed various arguments pointing to stricter credit terms on bank 
loans to borrowers with more carbon emissions. As creditors, banks should closely monitor the 
credit risk imposed by negative carbon-related shocks to the borrowing firms. Such shocks could 
be brought by additional and unpredicted regulations, with resultant compliance costs, potential 
litigation costs, and pollution mediation expenses.8  Emerging climate policies also create an 
environment that is hostile to carbon emitters, in which carbon-intensive projects could be subject 
to unfavorable conditions along the value chain.9 All of these lead to decreased profitability, 
heightened operational risk, and larger probability of default, giving rise to significant credit risk 
to funding providers (Thompson 1998; Hughes 2000; Konar and Cohen 2001; Clarkson, Li, and 
Richardson 2004; Labatt and White 2007; Chava 2014; Nguyen 2018). The banking industry as a 
whole could also face the embedded risk of financial instability from collectively unidentified and 
unmanaged lending portfolios concentrated with credit risk driven by climate policy and other 
carbon-related impacts (PwC 2016). Moreover, banks can be legally liable for environmental 
damages caused by the projects they finance, which constitutes a direct environmental risk faced 
by lenders (Pitchford 1995, 2001; Boyer and Laffont 1996, 1997; Heyes 1996; Thompson 1998; 
                                                           
8 A recent example is that the shipping industry, which relates to 80% of global trade but was omitted from the Kyoto 
Protocol, is getting regulated for the first time with respect to its GHG emissions. On April 13, 2018, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a resolution on reduction of GHG emissions from ships, setting the target of 
halving the emissions by 2050. According to The Guardian, the IMO agreement, binding across its 170 member states, 
“will require a revolution among ships, which are overwhelmingly fueled by heavy oils at present. In future, they will 
have to not only be more energy-efficient, but also make use of cleaner energy, in the form of batteries supplying 
electricity, solar and wind electricity generation, and perhaps even a return to sail in some cases, or more 
controversially to nuclear power, as some warships already use” 
(https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/apr/13/carbon-dioxide-from-ships-at-sea-to-be-regulated-for-first-
time). 
9 Consider the shipping industry mentioned in Footnote 8. Because many ships use dirty, carbon-rich fuels such as 
heavy diesel, which constitutes a cause of particular concern in a carbon sensitive world, they could be banned in 
many countries from onshore transport, although currently shipping accounts for only about 2% of global carbon 
emissions (https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/apr/13/carbon-dioxide-from-ships-at-sea-to-be-
regulated-for-first-time). 
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Balkenborg 2001; Kroszner and Strahan 2001; Chava 2014).10 Banks are therefore cautious in 
making lending decisions by taking into consideration possible negative climate impacts from the 
borrowers. Additionally, banks’ strategies of responding to carbon-related issues can influence 
their reputations and public images in a climate-sensitive world (thanks to the extensive 
intergovernmental carbon-reducing efforts), an inherent part of the business risk (Thompson 1998; 
Labatt and White 2007; Chen and Gao 2012; Chava 2014; Subramaniam, Wahyuni, Cooper, Leung, 
and Wines 2015).11 Despite these propositions, however, the society does not seem to be satisfied 
by banks’ practices to curb carbon emissions as there have been social pressures pushing banks to 
take more proactive stances when handling carbon-involved loan contracts. For example, carbon-
minded investors have filed climate-related resolutions with some U.S. banks, pressing the banks 
to develop strategies to address climate change risks.12 
Then, how do banks actually do in their loan contracting with carbon emitters? Surprisingly, 
the empirical evidence is still lacking in the literature, especially at the international level. As 
                                                           
10 For example, in the U.S., lenders are potentially liable for environmental damage caused by borrowers according to 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act and its Superfund Amendments. 
Similar laws include the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Toxic Substance Control Act, as well as the 
Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act (Chava 2014). A landmark case is Fleet Factors 1990 in which a bank was 
deemed to have influenced the borrower’s treatment of hazardous waste and was held liable for the clean-up costs 
(Coulson and Monks 1999). In the U.K., the Environment Act of 1995 has established a regime in which a lender 
could bear the responsibility of cleaning up contaminated land if it takes possession of the land from the polluter (Case 
1996). Campbell and Sherer (1996) describe a relevant case in which a hotel built on the site of a petrol station caused 
contamination of the soil. When the owner of the hotel defaulted to its funding bank and the owner of the petrol station 
could not be found, the bank faced both loan loss and the cost of cleaning up the contamination if it repossessed the 
hotel. Coulson and Monks (1999) provide more examples of lender liability. 
11 For example, in August 2017, the environmental campaign group Market Forces lodged a shareholder resolution 
against the Commonwealth Bank, one of the big four Australian banks, attacking the bank over its previous failure to 
rule out financing the Carmichael Coalmine, the largest coal mine in Australia that had drawn immense controversy 
about its damaging environmental impacts, including carbon emissions, and its status as the country’s biggest lender 
to Australia’s fossil fuel industry in 2016. The executive director of Market Forces declared that “we can’t allow a 
situation to continue where Australia’s biggest company continues to finance a massive fossil fuel industry expansion 
while feigning interest in a safe climate future. That’s why we’re moving a resolution that would embed climate 
change risk management into the heart of Commonwealth Bank” (https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2017/aug/14/commonwealth-banks-first-climate-policy-attacked-by-environmental-groups). For more 
examples about reputation risk to lenders, see Zeller (2010) and Chava (2014). 
12 https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-feel-heat-on-climatechange-issue-1391640572.  
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climate change is a global phenomenon and carbon-related risks to banks have different presences 
in different countries and regions, it is of particular importance to examine how banks all over the 
world function in their lending to parties with the potential of aggravating global warming. Using 
comprehensive international datasets on bank loans and firm-level carbon emission quantities 
covering 3,640 loans borrowed by 778 companies in 33 countries and regions from 2007 to 2014, 
we conduct a detailed empirical analysis on the relation between firm carbon emissions (both direct 
and indirect emissions) and loan contracting terms. We pay special attention to the responses to 
exogenous climate policy shocks, the cross-firm and cross-country/region differences, potential 
channels of the relation, and the loan terms’ impact on firms’ carbon reduction activities. 
Our results depict a mixed picture. Generally consistent with theoretical predictions, banks 
assign tougher terms to borrowers with more carbon emissions: larger loan spread, higher 
collateral requirement, and more covenants. However, this phenomenon is completely driven by 
the direct (i.e., Scope 1) emissions from GHG sources owned or controlled by the firms, because 
there is no significant relation between loan terms and indirect (i.e., Scope 2) emissions caused by 
consumption of electricity, steam, heat, cooling, etc. The evidence suggests that banks are only 
concerned about more traditional emitters and the associated risks in making their lending 
decisions, and neglect other carbon emissions from the usage of fossil fuel products which are 
indirect but nevertheless also contribute to the greenhouse effect. Notably, indirect carbon 
emissions take a nontrivial portion of the total emissions in our sample, with the mean and median 
levels of Scope 2 very close to those of Scope 1 among all firms (shown in Panel A, Table 2). 
Therefore, the absence of punishment on indirect emissions from bank loan contracts represents a 
huge pitfall in disciplining GHG emission and fighting global warming. 
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To confirm that the loan term effects are brought by emerging carbon-related concerns, we 
consider a natural experiment of climate policy shocks. Legislative reforms at both the 
international and country/region levels are hallmarks of the carbon control process. Regulatory 
changes, which are largely exogenous to private firms (including banks), induce not only tangible 
costs of compliance and other related legal issues, but also intangible costs from bad publicity, 
damaged brand names, and weakened competitive positions of carbon emitters. We find that, as 
more climate-related regulations are introduced, a firm tends to face a higher cost and collateral 
requirement of the loan for a given level of carbon emissions, suggesting increased vigilance of 
banks over the heightened carbon risks. This evidence corroborates our findings that carbon 
concerns constitute a significant influencing factor in bank loan contracting. 
We further examine the cross-sectional variations of the carbon-loan association. From the 
perspective of lenders, banks more actively participating in carbon-curbing organizations such as 
the Carbon Principles and the Climate Principles tend to adopt more stringent loan contracts to 
carbon emitting borrowers, especially in terms of loan spread and collateral requirement, 
consistent with the banks’ carbon-care property and firmer commitment to combating global 
warming. From the perspective of borrows, in firms with better climate change governance, as 
indicated by the ranks of managers charging climate change issues, carbon emission’s influence 
on loan collateral provisions becomes weaker, suggesting a beneficial effect of carbon control. The 
finding also implies reduced carbon risks for both firms and banks caused by better climate change 
administration. We also find that assuring the disclosed carbon quantities by a third party does not 
change carbon emission’s relation with bank loan terms. This helps relieve concerns about the 
quality of disclosed carbon emission information and ensures that our empirical analyses produce 
reliable evidence for carbon emission and loan contracting. Additional cross-country/region test 
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reveals a hindering effect of economic growth on emission mitigation, because, in faster-growing 
economies, carbon emission exhibits a much weaker relation with bank loan terms, suggesting that 
a country or region normally favors economic growth at the expense of the environment.  
To seek possible explanations for the relation between direct carbon emission and loan 
contracting, we specifically check whether the emission brings worse performance and higher risks 
to the lenders. We find that Scope 1 emission is positively associated with larger regulatory risk, 
deteriorated profitability, and higher probability of bankruptcy. This evidence provides legitimate 
reasons for banks to charge a higher funding cost or attach more constraints in the loan deals, and 
also reflects the influences from global-wide efforts that put broad-based pressures on carbon-
intensive firms.  
We find that the strict credit constraints faced by carbon intensive borrowing firms can 
have real effects on the firms’ carbon performance, making them more likely to adopt carbon 
reduction plans. This influence is more prominent as the carbon-sensitive loan terms become more 
stringent, suggesting that the potential penalty from bank credit helps improve climate change and 
the environment by reducing the carbon emissions of borrowers. Our results maintain after further 
controlling for other firm characteristics under alternative econometric specifications, and survive 
a battery of robustness tests including correcting for the uneven distribution of observations across 
the sample countries/regions and the potential self-selection bias from firms’ decisions to disclose 
carbon emissions. 
Our study stands out from the literature by providing international evidence on the 
relationship between carbon emission and bank loans. Global warming caused by GHG emissions 
is a global issue and deserves a global view to examine its impact. This perspective, however, is 
largely unexplored in academic research. Prior studies employing carbon emission data mainly 
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focus on a particular country or region, and they do not examine bank loans. For example, 
Matsumura, Prakash, and Vera-Munoz (2014) use carbon emission disclosed to the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), the same carbon dataset that we use in the current paper, to check how 
carbon emission influences the market capitalizations of large U.S. companies. Griffin, Lont, and 
Sun (2017) investigate the CDP carbon emission’s impact on stock prices of S&P500 firms. Kim, 
An, and Kim (2015) examine carbon emission and cost of equity in Korea.13 
Other studies, although focusing on bank loans (or more generally, corporate debts), do not 
involve carbon emission quantity data. Instead, they employ as the independent variable a much 
specific environmental indicator such as the release of toxic chemicals (Schneider 2011; Chava 
2014) or a much broad concept like corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate environmental 
responsibility (CER), or environmental, social and governance (ESG) (Goss and Roberts 2011; 
Kim, Surroca, and Tribo 2014; Ge and Liu 2015), and most of them do not present international 
evidence.14 Detailed carbon emission quantities provide more clear-cut indications for a firm’s 
contribution to global warming than chemical release or CSR/CER/ESG.15 The damage of toxic 
substance or other pollutants has long been witnessed by scientists, governments, and the public, 
but has not called for worldwide responses as dramatically as global warming that is recognized 
more recently. Although a relatively new issue, global warming has been considered as one of the 
greatest threats to human beings as climate change has manifested by unusual temperature variance, 
ocean acidification, coastal flooding, and extreme weathers, all of which have more systematic 
                                                           
13 To our knowledge, Misani and Pogutz (2015), who examine carbon emission’s impact on firm value, are the only 
study that uses the CDP data in an international setting.  
14 There are, of course, studies connecting specific environmental indicators and CSR/CER/ESG with economic 
performance measures other than bank loans, such as stakeholder value, cost of equity, excess stock return, and capital 
constraint. See, among others, Clarkson et al. (2004), El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra (2011), Deng, Kang, 
and Low (2013), and Wang, Delgado, and Xu (2016). 
15 Chava (2014) adopts an indicator variable that is related to carbon emission. The variable is set to one if a company 
derives substantial revenues from the sales or combustion of coal or oil (and the derived fuel products) and zero 
otherwise. Obviously, this binary variable does not deliver information about different emission quantities. 
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and devastating consequences than traditional pollution problems (IPCC 2013). In accordance with 
the emergence of the climate change warning, the international regulatory framework has been in 
place, specifically targeting at curbing global warming and reducing carbon emissions. This 
evolution suggests that governments’ and other economic stakeholders’ (including banks’) 
reactions to traditional pollutants and to carbon emission are different, and appear to be much 
stronger for carbon emission, although pollution (e.g., air pollution) may also contribute to carbon 
concentration and global warming. It is, therefore, necessary to have a specific check on the effects 
of carbon emission on bank lending. By the same token, carbon emission is of more direct 
relevance to global warming and the induced worldwide reactions than CSR/CER/ESG which has 
a much general coverage including but not limited to the environment. A firm’s environmental 
profile reflected in CSR/CER/ESG generally refers more to a perception than to a quantitative 
evaluation of carbon emission. Our study thus complements existing studies involving various 
environmental considerations. Furthermore, in this paper, we differentiate the influences of direct 
and indirect carbon emissions, and we also examine the cross-firm and cross-country/region 
differences of carbon emission’s impact on bank loans, as well as the real carbon-reducing effect 
due to the carbon-related loan restrictions, all of which constitute new contributions to the 
literature.16 
The finding that indirect carbon emissions are not punished by banks in loan contracting 
may be disappointing to a carbon sensitive mind, it is nevertheless consistent with the risk-based 
arguments about carbon emission. Existing international and regional policies mainly target at 
direct carbon emissions, and the lender liability laws are also restricted to contamination and 
cleanup, a consequence of direct pollution (Chava 2014; Griffin et al. 2017). The potential 
                                                           
16 Griffin et al. (2017) examine direct and indirect carbon emissions’ impacts on stock price but fail to document a 
qualitative difference between them. 
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reputational risk to lenders is less evident in loan deals with an indirect carbon emitter. After all, 
it would appear unusual if Apple, mainly an indirect emitter, is penalized by its creditors due to its 
carbon problems, especially when it boasts its super-green office complex.17 With the absence of 
the carbon-related credit risk, legal risk, and business risk, banks seem to exclude the indirect 
emission consideration from their lending decisions. However, the carbon footprint is by no means 
confined to direct emission and is likely to cover an increasingly broader scope. Indirect emission 
is a significant de facto contributor to total carbon emission and global warming. Our evidence 
thus has profound policy implications to regulators and calls upon greater efforts to regulate 
indirect carbon emissions including excessive consumption of fossil fuel derived products. 
Without interventions from the public sector, the private market does not seem to be able or willing 
to curb such emissions, as evidenced by the banking sector in our study. In other words, in order 
for banks to execute penalties to borrowers with large indirect carbon emissions, the governments 
should make it hurt to emit (even indirectly), i.e., increase risks faced by borrowers and lenders. 
Given the difficulties that the international community has encountered in deterring direct 
emissions, effectively mitigating indirect emissions could be an even bigger challenge. 
Another policy implication comes from our finding that the lender’s constraints on 
borrower’s carbon emissions are loosened for emitting firms in countries and regions with fast 
GDP growth, revealing a conflict between economic growth and global warming. With fossil fuels 
still the most important energy recourses to boost the economy, this conflict highlights the 
importance of actions taken by countries/regions, especially developing countries/regions, to make 
the incremental risks from extra emissions sufficiently large in order to deter excessive carbon 
                                                           
17 https://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2013/11/19/6-proposals-will-make-apples-new-hq-super-green.  
13 
intensity.18 Balancing economic growth with carbon mitigation appears to be a difficult problem 
to tackle. 
Despite these problems, the evidence that stricter loan terms to carbon emitting borrowers 
give rise to more firm carbon reduction activities is encouraging to carbon fighters. This effect of 
carbon-related loan pressure is also beneficial to the environment and the society since the efforts 
taken by firms could lead to concrete decease of GHG emissions. We believe this is the first 
evidence in the literature showing the real effects of bank loan constraints on firms’ carbon 
behaviors, which supplements the efforts from public regulations in curbing GHG levels. It also 
suggests that the public sector can go hand in hand with the private market against global warming.       
The rest of this article is organized as follows: We introduce the carbon emission quantity 
data, bank loan terms data, and other control variables in Section 2, along with the designs of 
empirical models. In Section 3, we provide main empirical evidence for the relation between 
carbon emission and loan terms, and take the implementations of incremental climate legislations 
as exogenous shocks to examine their impacts on the relation. We provide cross-sectional analyses 
of the carbon effects on bank loans in Section 4. In Section 5, we show that carbon emissions can 
significantly decrease profitability and increase regulatory and bankruptcy risks, the potential 
channels for the documented carbon-loan relation. Section 6 examines the real effects of loan terms 
on carbon emissions. We present further analyses and robustness tests in Section 7 and conclude 
in Section 8. 
2. Data and research design 
2.1. Carbon emission and bank loan terms data 
                                                           
18  According to the World Bank, over 80% of energy consumption is from fossil fuels by the end of 2015 
(https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.COMM.FO.ZS). 
14 
The key information in our study is about carbon emission quantity and specific bank loan 
terms. We obtain carbon emission data from the CDP, an international not-for-profit organization 
that runs a global survey soliciting climate-related information from companies worldwide. 
Comparing with other sources, CDP dataset is especially suitable for our study for the following 
reasons: First, the CDP has a broad international coverage. It has built the most comprehensive 
collection of carbon emission data in the world, which are used by 800 institutional investors with 
US$ 100 trillion in assets, along with policy makers around the globe.19 Second, the banking 
industry is an important party that closely follows the carbon emission information from the CDP. 
In fact, the project obtains backing from commercial and investment banks including HSBC, 
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, American International 
Group, and State Street Corp.20 Third, of particular interest to our study, companies respond to the 
CDP survey each year by providing the numerical amount of their carbon emissions. The reported 
quantities include both Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, as defined by the GHG Protocol. 
Specifically, carbon emissions in Scope 1 are referred to as direct emissions from sources that are 
owned or controlled by the company; Scope 2 emissions, which are considered indirect, are mainly 
from consumption of purchased electricity, steam, or other sources of energy. Unlike other data 
sources such as the KLD Stats in which carbon emission information is indicated by a binary 
variable (i.e., with vs. without emissions), CDP provides much detailed and concrete quantification 
of carbon emissions. 
Although a voluntary disclosure scheme, the CDP survey has attracted a large number of 
companies to respond.21 The self-reported emission information is generally considered credible 
                                                           
19 https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us. 
20 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_Disclosure_Project. 
21 According to the information accessed on August 20, 2018 at the CDP website, more than 6,300 companies from 
over 100 states and regions responded to its questionnaire in the most recent year.   
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in the literature because the data can be compared across similar firms in the market, or cross-
checked with the data reported to the government under the mandatory disclosure schemes in some 
jurisdictions such as the EU, Australia, and the U.S. The disclosed emissions are also assured by 
an independent third party or monitored by internal auditors for many firms. The self-discipline of 
truthful reporting is also affirmed by the repeated interactions between the CDP and firms which 
attach potential reputation or litigation costs to misreporting (Stanny 2013; Matsumura et al. 2014). 
In fact, we will show that external assurance does not exhibit a significant influence on our results 
and our analyses are robust to correcting potential self-selection bias from the voluntary reporting 
scheme, suggesting that the carbon emission data are generally reliable, and are not sensitive to 
auditing or subject to the influence from managers’ decisions to disclose. With the expanding 
influences of CDP, the academia has started to employ the emission data in scholarly research (e.g., 
Matsumura et al. 2014; Griffin et al. 2017). Nevertheless, existing research does not differentiate 
between Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, which we will do in this study. The CDP dataset also 
includes valuable information in addition to carbon emissions that helps in a deeper understanding 
of a company’s carbon-related situation. Besides the indicator for emission assurance, we retrieve 
variables for regulatory risk, the level of climate change governance, and carbon reduction plan of 
the reporting firms (with definitions detailed in the Appendix), which enable the analyses on firms’ 
risks and overall carbon administration profiles. 
The data source for bank loans is Deal Scan, including detailed lending information at loan 
level. We focus on the following key loan contracting terms in our main tests: 1) the cost of loan, 
Spread, defined as the natural logarithm of total amount in basis points paid by a borrower over 
LIBOR for each dollar drawn down; 2) the collateral condition of the loan, Secured, taking the 
value of one if the loan involves collaterals and zero otherwise; 3) the covenant condition, 
16 
Covenants, referring to the number of total covenants. These variables reflect the stringency of the 
loan contract, and thus an overall burden of the funding. In additional analyses, we further examine 
the annual fee of each loan and the numbers of general and financial covenants. When checking 
carbon emission’s impact on these loan terms, we control for the size and maturity of the loan, as 
well as performance pricing provisions. These definitions are explained in the Appendix. 
Our sample period covers the calendar years of 2007 to 2014. After matching bank loan 
data with carbon emission data, we have a final sample of 3,640 loans on 778 borrowers in 33 
countries and regions.   
2.2. Main empirical models 
Our baseline model examines how bank loan terms are associated with a company’s carbon 
emissions, as follows: 
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              (1) 
where Loanclit is one of the contracting measures introduced above of loan l borrowed by firm i of 
country/region c in year t. Carboncit refers to carbon emissions (total, Scope 1, or Scope 2, after 
taking natural logarithm) of the borrower disclosed for the bank loan year.22 Following Patten 
(2002), Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari (2008), and Sutantoputra, Lindorff, and Johnson 
(2012), we adjust the carbon value by dividing by total sales (in million US$ computed using the 
foreign exchange rates of the corresponding year obtained from the World Bank) of fiscal year t 
                                                           
22 We match contracting variable values of bank loans in year t with carbon emission values disclosed in the same 
year even though the emission data for year t are not available until the mid of the following year. This method follows 
Matsumura et al. (2014) who assume that the best estimation of the expectation of carbon emissions is the subsequently 
realized value. 
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to make the carbon effect more comparable across firms with different scales. We will show in the 
robustness test that our results are qualitatively consistent if using the unadjusted raw values of 
carbon emissions. Our interest is on the coefficient β1 which indicates the impact of carbon 
emission on loan terms. Other independent variables in the first row of Model (1) are controls for 
loan characteristics, including the natural logarithm of loan size Loan Size, the natural logarithm 
of loan maturity Loan Maturity, and an indicator for the inclusion of performance pricing 
provisions in the loan Performance Pricing. These characteristic variables are shown in the 
literature to influence loan contracting, especially the cost of loan (spread) (Graham, Li, and Qiu 
2008; Kim, Song, and Zhang 2011; Deng, Willis, and Xu 2014). 
 The second row of Model (1) controls for firm-level variables based on prior studies such 
as Graham et al. (2008), Chava (2014), and Bradley and Roberts (2015). Firm Size is measured as 
the natural logarithm of total assets; Tangibility is the ratio of gross property, plant and equipment 
to total assets; Leverage is the ratio of current and long-term debts to total assets; ROA refers to 
return on assets, proxied by pretax income scaled by total assets; Z-score indicates modified Z-
score following Altman (1968); Operation Risk is estimated as the standard deviation of yearly 
cash flows from operations divided by total assets over the past five years. These variables are 
computed each fiscal year for each firm i in country/region c, and we merge bank loan data with 
borrowers’ financial statement data for the fiscal year before the loans are initiated to make sure 
that the relevant information is available to banks prior to the loan initiation dates. Financial 
accounting data are from Compustat Global. 
 Given the international scope of our study, we further control for country/region-level 
variables widely adopted in international banking studies (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
1999), as shown in the third row of Model (1). Inflation and Economic Growth refer to inflation 
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rate and GDP growth rate based on 2010 US$, respectively. GDP is the natural logarithm of GDP 
per capita, also based on 2010 US$. The information is obtained from the World Bank. We also 
include an indicator variable for common law countries/regions Common and the creditor rights 
index Creditor Rights, both from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) to 
control for the difference in legal environment. We update the data for each country/region c in 
each year t, and match them with loan contracts of the corresponding country/region in the same 
year.  
 To investigate the cross-firm/bank and cross-country/region differences in the relationship 
between carbon emission and loan contracting, we add into the independent variables in Model (1) 
a specific firm/bank or country/region feature variable and its interaction with the carbon emission 
variable, as shown in Model (2) below: 
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(2) 
We are interested in the coefficient of the interaction term β3, along with Carbon’s 
coefficient β1, to see whether the cross-firm/bank or cross-country/region feature mitigates or 
aggravates carbon emission’s impact. Specifically, to examine how a bank’s carbon vigilance 
affects its lending behavior as a response to borrowers’ carbon emissions, we use a Carbon-care 
Bank dummy variable as Feature in Model (2). Carbon-care Bank equals one if the lead bank of 
the loan belongs to an organization committing to carbon reduction such as the Carbon Principles 
and the Climate Principles, and zero otherwise.23 From the perspective of borrowers, we replace 
                                                           
23 Specifically, Carbon-care Bank equals one if the lead bank is one of the following banks and zero otherwise: 
Citigroup Inc., JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Crédit Agricole, Munich Re, Standard Chartered, Swiss Re, and 
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Feature with a variable Carbon Governance that measures a firm’s commitment to carbon 
reduction to check the influence of such commitment in its borrowing from banks. Carbon 
Governance is an ordinal variable that equals 5 if the highest-level charging climate change issues 
in the firm is board or board committee, 4 for CEO, 3 for vice-president or other senior managers, 
2 for department or department managers, 1 for no individual or committee, and 0 otherwise. 
Another firm-level feature variable is Emission Assurance, an indicator taken the value of one if a 
firm has its carbon emission data assured by a third party, and zero otherwise. Both the Carbon 
Governance and Carbon Assurance variables are adopted from the CDP survey. In a similar vein, 
we use the country/region feature variable High Economic Growth to examine the cross-
country/region change of the carbon emission effect on loan terms. High Economic Growth equals 
one if a country/region’s economic growth rate as estimated by the World Bank is higher than the 
sample median in a given year, and zero otherwise.          
In all the model specifications, we control for industry fixed effect using Fama-French 12-
industry classifications, and also time fixed effect according to the calendar years within our 
sample period. We use Logit regressions when the loan contracting dependent variables are binary, 
for example, Secured, and use ordinary least squares (OLS) and Poisson regressions when loan 
spread and number of covenants are used as the dependent variables, respectively. In examining 
the statistical significance of the regression coefficients, we compute z- or t-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. 
3. Carbon emission and bank loan contracting: Main results 
                                                           
HSBC. These banks either are the founding partners of the Carbon Principles, or adopt the Climate Principles. We do 
not include members of the Equator Principles (as introduced in Footnote 7) because most of our sample banks belong 
to this group. 
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3.1. Sample distribution and descriptive statistics 
For a basic understanding of our international data, we first present in Table 1 the cross-
country/region distribution of carbon emission, loan number, and other country/region-level 
economic and legal variables that are used in our analyses. Numbers in the three columns about 
the logarithms of total, Scope 1, and Scope 2 carbon emissions are averaged over all firm-years in 
each country or region. Values about inflation, economic growth rate, and the logarithm of GDP 
per capita are average over the sample years. Common law indicator and creditor rights rating are 
from La Porta et al. (1998) and keep unchanged in the sample period. The last column shows the 
total number of loans from each country or region. In general, direct (Scope 1) carbon emissions 
are larger than indirect (Scope 2) carbon emissions, but not by big margins. Actually, among the 
33 countries and regions, one third of them have average indirect emission levels higher than direct 
emission levels. This fact is echoed by the statistics in Panel A of Table 2 where these two types 
of emissions have similar mean (with Scope 1 mean slightly higher) and the same median values 
at the firm level. Therefore, indirect emissions constitute a great part of total carbon emissions. 
The U.S. has the largest number of bank loans of 1,163, about one-third of the full sample of 3,640 
loan observations, followed by Japan with 805 loans. We will show that our main results are not 
driven by these dominating countries since the conclusions still hold when we conduct the analyses 
after excluding U.S. firms or U.S. & Japanese firms, or only including U.S. firms.      
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of main testing variables in the full sample. Panel A 
shows that the average total carbon emission (in metric tonnes) relative to sales (in million US$) 
of a firm is 4.740, with an inverse log value of 114.434. The average of Scope 1 emission is 3.751, 
and the average of Scope 2 emission is 3.535. Scope 1 emissions vary more across firms with 
larger standard deviation and could be influenced by some extreme numbers (for example, from 
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Chile and Colombia, as shown in Table 1). The median values, which are immune to statistical 
outliers, show that Scope 1 emission has the same level as Scope 2 emission, both with the value 
of 3.325, which is lower than their means. This suggests that, at least according to the median 
value, indirect carbon emission contributes to global warming no less than direct emission, a 
phenomenon worth sufficient attention from both the public and private sectors. 
Panels B to D of Table 2 report summary statistics for loan, firm, and country/region 
variables, respectively. Bank loans in our sample have an average size of about US$ 906.70 million 
and a median maturity of five years (both computed before taking logarithm). At least 75% of 
them do not involve collaterals, covenants, or performance pricing provisions. Loan borrowers are 
relatively large firms with average total assets of over US$ 41,772 million (about 10.64 after taking 
natural logarithm). Our sample countries/regions have an average GDP per capita of US$ 40,134 
(about 10.60 after taking natural logarithm) and an average annual growth rate of 1.60% during 
the sample period. 
3.2. Baseline results 
In Table 3, we report results about the relation between total carbon emission and three key 
bank loan contracting measures: loan spread Spread, collateral requirement Secured, and number 
of total covenants Covenants, according to Model (1). Column (1) shows a positive and highly 
significant association between total carbon emission and loan spread with an emission coefficient 
of 0.041 and t-value of 3.12, after controlling for an extensive list of loan, firm, and country/region 
variables. Economically, an emission increase by one standard deviation (2.076, as shown in Panel 
A of Table 2) leads to an increase of loan spread of 1.089 basis points (inverse log value) in excess 
of LIBOR. The result suggests that for firms throughout the world, more carbon emission leads to 
higher cost of loan in general. This is largely consistent with the overall conclusion from existing 
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literature that an environment-friendly firm or project (as reflected in pollutant, CSR, etc.) 
normally enjoys a lower funding cost, but we are the first to document the undesirable impact of 
carbon emission on loan cost in an international setting. 
The second column of Table 3, reporting the result from a Logit regression, shows that 
higher level of carbon emission makes it more likely for banks to require collaterals for loans. The 
Logit coefficient is 0.087, corresponding to an odds ratio of 1.091. Therefore, for a one standard 
deviation increase in carbon emission of a firm, the odds of involving collaterals in its loan 
contracts is about 19.80% larger. Poisson regression coefficient of 0.065 in the third column further 
reveals that banks also insert more covenants to loan contracts signed with borrowers with more 
carbon emissions: If a firm increases its emission level by one standard deviation of the sample 
value, the difference in the logs of expected counts of covenants would be expected to increase by 
0.135, i.e., the covenant number would be increased by 1.14. In both Columns (2) and (3), the 
coefficients of total carbon emission are statistically significant. This evidence implies that banks 
generally attach tougher clauses in addition to the interest-related terms in loan contracts when 
lending to an intensive carbon emitter. These clauses and terms help protect the banks from 
potential risks caused by the excessive carbon emissions of the borrowers, as proposed by 
numerous studies about the environmental risk to banks. 
Among the control variables, loan characteristics (size, maturity, and performance pricing 
provision) generally have significant relations with the three dependent loan contracting variables, 
but the signs of their coefficients are not always consistent. For example, larger loans tend to have 
lower spread and collateral-requirement likelihood, but also lead to more covenants. Longer loans 
are associated with higher spread and collateral likelihood, but do not appear to affect covenants. 
At the firm-level, larger firm size, more tangible assets, lower leverage, higher ROA, higher Z-
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score tend to relieve the stringency of loan contracts, consistent with their economic implications 
with regard to the risk exposure to credit providers. Higher operation risk induces more covenants, 
but also less collateral provisions. Country/region-level control variables show less significant and 
less consistent relations with different loan contracting measures than the loan-and firm-level 
controls. Only credit rights and GDP level exhibits consistently significant coefficients in all three 
models, pointing to more stringent loan terms in countries/regions with higher GDP per capita and 
weaker creditor rights. Overall, the relation between total carbon emission and loan contracting 
variables is not subsumed by these factors from different levels. 
In Table 4, we examine whether banks give similar weights to direct and indirect emissions 
in their lending decisions. We separately run regressions of Model (1) using Scope 1 and Scope 2 
as the carbon emission measures, and report the results in Columns (1)-(3) and Columns (4)-(6), 
respectively. The findings are striking. Direct Scope 1 carbon emission shows significant and 
positive relations with loan spread, loan collateral provision, and loan covenants. These relations 
are similar (in terms of coefficient magnitude and significance level) to the results about total 
emission (as in Table 3). In sharp contrast, indirect Scope 2 emission does not exhibit any obvious 
associations with the three loan contracting variables. Its coefficients are statistically insignificant 
and also have inconsistent signs. The message is clear: The impact of total carbon emission on 
loan contracting documented in Table 3 is driven by direct emission rather than indirect emission, 
and the bank loan market does not penalize indirect emission from the borrowers. Considering the 
scientific facts that both types of emissions cause global warming and our statistics (in Table 2, 
Panel A) that Scope 2 takes a great part of the carbon emission, the finding that Scope 2 emission 
does not influence loan terms is astonishing. It appears that banks are carbon-blind when facing 
loan deals with borrowers as consumers of fossil fuel products, even though the carbon emissions 
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from such consumption can be substantial. Indirect carbon emissions seem to be largely neglected 
in the bank credit market worldwide, in spite of the strong informational and analytical capabilities 
of banks and the great efforts from all parties to make the international community carbon-minded. 
Our evidence thus calls for more attention from stakeholders, especially the regulators, to monitor 
and manage indirect carbon emissions, and discipline GHG emitting of all kinds. 
In summary, our baseline results suggest that the global banking industry as a private sector 
does have environment teeth: Significant carbon emitters generally find it difficult to obtain 
favorable terms in their loan contracting with banks – they have to pay more interest and fee, and 
are subject to more collaterals and covenants. However, these teeth do not always bite. Borrowers 
that emit carbon indirectly do not face any environment-related penalties when obtaining loans 
from banks, a phenomenon deserves more scrutiny and rectification.                                
3.3. Exogenous legislation shocks: A natural experiment 
The fast increase in the number of climate change policies throughout the world provides 
an ideal setting to investigate how bank loan contracting responses to carbon-related shocks. As 
explained in previous sections, carbon legislations are closely associated with the potential 
negative consequences and the induced costs from carbon emissions. A more stringent regulatory 
environment makes the same amount of carbon emissions more costly and riskier to the firm. To 
put it another way, the effect of applying additional carbon regulations with a given emission level 
is conceptually akin to the effect of increasing carbon emission levels under a given legislative 
framework. We can thus infer carbon emission’s impact on bank loans by examining the shocks 
from regulation changes. As the introductions of international- or national-level legislations are 
largely exogenous to individual banks and firms, such investigation helps ease the concerns about 
25 
potential endogeneity problems in our tests about the relation between loan terms and carbon 
emission.       
We execute this exercise by constructing a carbon emission legislation index. The index is 
the accumulative number of carbon-related laws or regulations introduced in a country or region 
along the timeline in our sample period. For each country/region, the index value at the beginning 
of the sample period of 2007 equals the total number of existing legislations. When a new 
law/regulation is implemented, we add one to the index value. To each loan, we assign the latest 
value of the index to it according to the location of its initiation. The legislation data are from 
London School of Economics and Political Science, which tracks detailed climate change laws of 
the world.24 To identify the laws that are designed for mitigation or adaptation of climate change, 
we manually go through the contents of each law and make sure that the law is either intended to 
reduce carbon emission or increase the cost of carbon emission (i.e., carbon pricing).25  
We add the carbon emission legislation index as an additional independent variable in 
Model (1), along with the carbon emission variable and its interaction term with the legislation 
index. This approach enables us to specifically identify the impacts of the exogenous legislation 
shocks on the relation between carbon emission and loan contracting measures, given the same 
level of emission. Since Table 4 has shown that the impact on loan terms is mainly from direct 
carbon emissions, we use Scope 1 emission as the carbon measure from here onward. Results 
reported in Table 5 show that the coefficients of the interaction term (Scope 1 Carbon 
Emission*Carbon Emission Legislation Index) in all three columns are positive, and statistically 
significant in the first two. In general, given the level of carbon emission, adding climate laws to 
                                                           
24 http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/climate-change-laws-of-the-world. 
25 One example is the U.S. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, which introduces measures to address 
climate change, including reducing carbon emissions and improving the usage of renewable energy. 
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the legislative arsenal leads to tougher bank loan terms, as reflected in increased loan spread and 
collateral-requirement likelihood. The result indicates lenders’ concerns about the heightened level 
of potential regulatory risk under the new and more stringent legislative environment. Such 
concerns may extend to other related business risks because more regulations not only make 
carbon emission more profit- and value-destroying to the firm, but also could further foster the 
carbon sensitivity in the society. The evidence from exogenous shock testing supports our general 
conclusion about carbon emission’s influence on bank loan contracting.         
4. Cross-sectional differences 
Carbon emission’s, in particular, Scope 1 emission’s association with bank loan contracting 
terms documented above is the average effect throughout all sample firms and banks in all 
countries and regions. As the carbon-related risk factors do not have an even distribution across 
firms/banks and countries/regions, we move on to investigate the difference of the carbon-loan 
relation between firms/banks and countries/regions according to a few differentiating features, 
including a bank’s seriousness in taking care of climate change problems, a firm’s governance on 
carbon issues and the accountability of its carbon disclosure, as well as a country/region’s 
economic growth. We use the methodology in Model (2) to examine the regression coefficient of 
the interaction term of a particular feature and carbon emission, which enables us to include various 
controls when examining the cross-firm/bank or cross-country/region differences. We report 
results for Scope 1 emission because it is the only type that has significant relations with loan 
contracting variables. 
4.1. Cross-bank analysis 
We first differentiate the carbon-loan relation among banks, i.e., lenders. Different banks 
may have different understandings and stances in dealing with carbon-related issues in their 
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lending practices. Some of them take a leading position by establishing or participating in carbon 
reduction organizations in the financial industry, such as the Carbon Principles and the Climate 
Principles. These banks tend to have clearer comprehension of carbon risk and firmer commitment 
to carbon mitigation, which would naturally be reflected in their lending behaviors. Specifically, 
we expect that these carbon-care banks are more likely to adopt stricter contracting terms in their 
loans to carbon emitters. To test this, we adopt the indicator for a bank’s firm carbon stance, 
Carbon-care Bank (which equals one if the bank exhibits strong commitment to climate change 
responsibility; see Section 2 and the Appendix for definition), as Feature in Model (2), and interact 
it with Scope 1 carbon emission in the regressions. Panel A of Table 6 reports the result, in 
particular, the coefficient of Scope 1 Carbon Emission’s interaction term with Carbon-care Bank, 
which effectively shows the difference of the carbon-loan relation between high and low carbon-
commitment banks after other variables are controlled. The result shows that the coefficients of 
the interactions in Columns (1) and (2) are significantly positive, suggesting that the relation 
between carbon emission and loan spread and the relation between carbon emission and collaterals 
do show a significant difference due to the difference in lenders’ care about climate change. 
Specifically, if the lending banks have more concerns over carbon emissions, firms as borrowers 
tend to face higher levels of loan cost and collateral requirement, ceteris paribus. This evidence is 
consistent with our expectation, and also reveals the importance of carbon risk awareness and 
management for credit suppliers in affecting the bank loan market.  
4.2. Cross-firm analysis 
From the borrowers’ perspective, how does the firm-level commitment to carbon reduction 
affect its bank loan contracting? We examine this issue in Panel B of Table 6 by using the ordinal 
value for a firm’s carbon governance (the larger the value, the better the governance; see Section 
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2 and the Appendix for details) in the interaction term with Scope 1 carbon emission. The 
interaction term has significantly negative coefficient in the second column with loan collateral 
provision indicator as the dependent variable, while in the other two columns the interaction 
coefficients are insignificant. Therefore, if climate change issues are taken care of by higher-rank 
managers, the firm are subject to less collateral constraints. Generally, better carbon 
management/governance could suggest that the firm is well prepared for future carbon shocks due 
to regulatory compliance and emission abatement costs, which reduces the risk perceptions of 
banks and earns better terms in the firm’s loan funding. A company thus can benefit from a lower 
bank financing expense if treating carbon emission issues more seriously through an internal 
control system. 
The carbon emission quantity data we use in this study are self-reported by firms to the 
CDP. How reliable are these data? In other words, how truthful are the firms’ disclosures? Prior 
studies involving the CDP data have generally concluded that the emission disclosure under the 
CDP framework is largely credible due to the large potential cost for untruthful reporting 
(Matsumura et al. 2014). We confirm this conclusion from a cross-sectional test in Panel C. 
Specifically, we compare the associations of bank loan contracting variables with firm-reported 
carbon emission values assured by an independent third party and emission values not assured. 
The fact that assurance is not mandatory facilitates such analysis. If the self-reported numbers are 
substantially biased or misleading, which attaches additional informational risk for data users, then 
the assurance arrangement helps improve the disclosure quality by revealing and rectifying the 
problem, making the assured reporting more trustable than the unassured reporting. In other words, 
assurance will make a big difference if the voluntary carbon disclosures are generally unreliable. 
Banks should be aware of this difference and treat borrowers with and without carbon emission 
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assurance differently, even though the emissions are of the same quantitative level. Our result 
shows, however, that assurance makes no difference. None of the carbon emission and assurance 
interaction coefficients in the three columns is significantly different from zero. This evidence 
suggests that banks are not concerned about whether firms’ carbon emission disclosures are 
assured when determining the loan terms. There are two possible explanations for this finding: 
Either the assurance providers are not reliable, or the disclosed emission numbers are reliable so 
that assurance does not significantly improve their credibility. As the assurance service is generally 
provided by an independent and professional institute such as a public accounting firm or a 
governmental agency, it is more likely that the second interpretation is more likely, i.e., at least for 
banks, the disclosed carbon numbers to the CDP are generally reflecting the true emission 
situation.26   
4.3. Cross-country/region analysis 
We further examine whether Scope 1 emission affects loan terms differently in countries 
and regions with different economic growth rates. Using the High Economic Growth dummy as 
Feature in Model (2), Panel D shows that after adding economic growth and the interaction term, 
Scope 1 emission maintains its significantly positive relations with loan spread, the collateral 
variable, and the covenant variable. The coefficient of the interaction in Column (1) is significantly 
negative, suggesting that the relationship between carbon emission and loan spread is weaker in 
high growth countries/regions than in low growth countries/regions, which implies a general trade-
off between maintaining a fast economic growth and keeping a high financing cost to emitters, 
                                                           
26 We are, of course, not claiming that assurance is useless. Instead, the general reliability of emission numbers could 
be due to the validity effect of potential assurance. A firm’s disclosure currently unassured could be subject to an 
assurance mechanism in the future as mandated by regulators or business organizations. If an untruthful reporting 
history of unassured emissions is eventually uncovered by assurance agencies, it will damage a firm’s overall 
credibility.  
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because the emitters may be the contributors to both global warming and economic growth. Result 
about loan collateral in Column (2) delivers consistent message because the interaction term also 
has a significantly negative coefficient. Banks are less likely to require collaterals from carbon-
emitting borrowers in high growth countries/regions than in low growth countries/regions. 
Economic growth rate does not seem to have a significant influence on the relationship between 
carbon emission and number of loan covenants, as shown in Column (3) where the coefficient of 
the interaction variable is not significantly different from zero. Overall, our evidence suggests a 
conflict between environment protection and economic growth, which constitutes an inherent 
challenge to the world in the process of achieving the carbon mitigation goal, although the ultimate 
purpose of curbing global warming is for a better economic development.                              
5. Possible channels: Profitability deterioration, regulatory risk, and bankruptcy risk  
 Perhaps the most prominent carbon-related risk comes from regulations because the 
defining feature of global warming as a global issue is governmental responses to it in an 
international scope. Any carbon emitter (especially Scope 1 carbon emitter) is operating under the 
vast net of policies with expanding number of knots. This issue is so crucial that the CDP survey 
asks the participating firms to specifically indicate whether regulatory risk is their concern. Does 
more carbon emission lead to higher regulatory risk? If so, the regulatory risk could be one of the 
possible explanations for the positive relation between carbon emission and cost of bank loans. 
We examine this issue in a Logit regression model with firms’ answers to the regulatory risk article 
in the CDP survey (one for the answer “yes” and zero for “no”) as the dependent variable and 
Scope 1 carbon emission as the key independent variable, after controlling for the loan-, firm-, and 
county/region-level characteristics (as in Model (1)) and industry and year fixed effects. Column 
(1) of Table 7 shows that the Scope 1 carbon emission variable has a positive and highly significant 
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coefficient, suggesting that regulatory risk is more likely to be a concern if a firm emits more GHG. 
This finding points to a potential channel for the carbon emission-loan cost relation with solid 
economic justifications. In addition, with the aid of the CDP data, we are able to specifically 
document how carbon emission is related to regulatory risk concern, which is also new in the 
literature. 
 As argued in previous sections, for carbon emission mitigation, the influences of 
regulations are not confined to pure policy-related issues. Logically, the regulatory risk faced by 
the firm can manifest in unexpected losses from compliance, remediation, litigation, reputation, as 
well as other components of the value chain. Therefore, regulatory risk could result in undesirable 
consequences of various forms. To shed light on this issue in a more concrete way, we select a 
particular and arguably important aspect, the profitability, to further explore the potential channel 
for the carbon-loan relation. If lenders penalize excessive carbon emission via exercising more 
stringent loan terms, it could be detrimental to the borrowers’ profitability through increasing the 
cost of capital, along with other influencing factors. The prospect of deteriorated profitability of a 
firm in turn constitutes a risk to the lenders which further affects their future loans to the firm. 
Therefore, profitability could potentially influence banks’ lending decisions. To see whether 
carbon emission harms a firm’s profitability, we regress next year’s profitability measure ROA (as 
defined in the Appendix) on current year’s Scope 1 carbon emission. Column (2) of Table 7 shows 
that the coefficient of Scope 1 emission is significantly negative, confirming the conjecture that 
the worsened prospect of a firm profit-making ability could be related to a firm’s irresponsible 
excessive carbon emission, which helps explain the stricter loan terms that the firm bears.    
As for lenders, perhaps the most critical concern is credit risk, and all the above mentioned 
problems would eventually translate to credit risk. Banks charge higher funding cost and impose 
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tougher loan constraining terms when facing higher credit risk. We next examine whether carbon 
emission also affects credit risk faced by banks, another possible channel for its impact on bank 
loans. As we cannot track and clearly identify the credit risk caused by each project financed by a 
particular loan, we focus on the probability of insolvency of the whole carbon-emitting firm, i.e., 
the overall bankruptcy risk of the firm, to seek some indirect evidence. Although the bankruptcy 
of a firm is triggered by various factors, its carbon performance is relevant because the literature 
has shown that environmental risk is a significant component of bankruptcy risk (Schneider 2011). 
Chava (2014), when examining the possible explanations for carbon concerns and cost of debt, 
also adopts bankruptcy risk as a way to reflect credit risk. In Column (3) of Table 7, we run OLS 
regressions using the probability of bankruptcy as the dependent variable and Scope 1 carbon 
emission as the key explanatory variable, with the same controls as in Columns (1) and (2). The 
probability of bankruptcy is estimated from a Cox proportional hazard model each year for each 
firm, and matched with the firm’s carbon emission data of that year.27 The result demonstrates that 
more carbon emission does expose the firm to higher likelihood of bankruptcy, as evidenced by 
the significantly positive coefficient of Scope 1 emission. Therefore, bankruptcy risk, and arguably 
credit risk, seems to be part of the considerations of banks in determining loan contracting terms 
with carbon-emitting borrowers. To our knowledge, this is the first piece of evidence confirming 
the connection between carbon emission and bankruptcy risk in the literature, and again, we show 
the evidence from a comprehensive international dataset.28 Our finding also suggests that the 
                                                           
27 In the Cox model, the dependent variable is set to one if the firm files for bankruptcy during the sample period, and 
zero otherwise. We use covariates from Shumway (2001) in the estimation, including the ratio of net income to total 
assets, the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, current assets scaled by current liabilities, and firm age. 
28 To our knowledge, the only prior study that examines the relation between pollutant emission and probability of 
bankruptcy is Chava (2014). Chava (2014) uses an indicator variable for some specific types of carbon emissions to 
document an insignificant relation with bankruptcy probability. His data, however, are only confined to the U.S. large 
firms and his carbon measure is binary which does not reflect quantitative difference in carbon emission (see Footnote 
15 for details).  
33 
negative impacts of a firm’s carbon emission could be severe enough to influence the overall 
solvency of the firm.   
6. Real effects of bank lending on carbon emission decision  
 Applying more stringent loan terms to excessive carbon emitting borrowers can be 
considered as a private market activity to protect banks’ benefit. Do such private activities help 
achieve the goal of carbon mitigation that is beneficial to the general public? In other words, does 
carbon-sensitive bank lending change firms’ behavior of carbon emission? If banks put much 
pressure on firms with large carbon emissions through tightened lending terms, firms could 
consider lowering their emission levels to exchange for better loan deals. If firm managers decide 
to change their emitting behaviors, more specifically, emit less, as a response to the lending 
behaviors of banks, bank loan could lead to lower levels of carbon emissions. These carbon-related 
real effects of loan contracting are of significant importance not only to the borrowers and lenders, 
but also to the overall progress of fighting climate change. 
 We examine whether bank loan terms can have such real effects in Table 8, where we 
construct a Loan Term Strictness variable that incorporates the influences of the three key loan 
terms: loan spread, collaterals, and covenants. Specifically, Loan Term Strictness is the first 
component of the principal component analysis (PCA) of Spread, Secured, and Covenants, 
representing an overall assessment of the stringency, with higher values indicating stricter loan 
terms. The real effect is reflected by a dummy variable Carbon Reduction Plan which takes a value 
of one if a firm has carbon emission reduction plan (as indicated in the CDP data) in the coming 
year, and zero otherwise. We regress Carbon Reduction Plan on the loan strictness variable and 
its interaction term with Scope 1 carbon emission in a Logit model. The result shows that the 
interaction term has a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that, for a given level of 
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carbon emission, stricter loan terms tend to make firms more likely to adopt carbon reduction plan. 
This result is the first evidence in the literature showing the real effects of bank lending on carbon 
emission decision, which provides relevant insights to policy makers in assessing the impacts of 
regulations, both directly on emitting firms, but indirectly through private market players such as 
banks. The evidence about its efficacy in carbon reduction is central to the justification of climate 
change regulation.     
7. Further analyses and robustness tests 
7.1. Further analysis: Carbon emission and other bank loan contracting terms 
We use loan spread, collateral requirement, and the number of total covenants as the loan 
contracting terms in the main tests. These terms represent the general costs and constraints that a 
borrower faces in its bank loan funding. In this section, we consider more bank loan contracting 
variables and see whether carbon emission’s impact also extends to them. Table 9 reports the 
results under the Model (1) specification. 
We first examine different types of loan covenants, i.e., general covenants and financial 
covenants. As parts of the controlling mechanism, both types provide protection of creditor’s 
interest, but financial covenants are more triggered by financial benchmarks. It is therefore 
interesting to check whether banks believe carbon emissions have direct impact on a firm’s 
financial performance and thus introduce financial covenants in the loan contracts, and similarly, 
whether carbon emissions influence non-financial conditions of the firm and thus the general 
covenants in its loans. The first two columns of Table 9 show that only general covenants are 
sensitive to borrower’s carbon emission level, with significantly positive coefficient of Scope 1 
emission. Financial covenants are not significantly influenced by carbon emission. Therefore, it 
appears that banks believe carbon emission affects conditions of a firm mainly through the non-
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financial ways, which they take into consideration in designing the loan covenant terms. The link 
between carbon emission and financial benchmarks that trigger financial covenants seems to be 
loose in the eyes of banks. This evidence also suggests that the results about total covenants in the 
main tests are mainly driven by general covenants.   
In Column (3), we examine carbon emission’s relation with the annual fee of the bank loan. 
Annual fee is measured in basis points (after taking natural logarithm, see the Appendix for details) 
and reflects additional cost on top of interest rate. Consistent with loan spread which incorporates 
both interest and fee, the result shows that annual fee is positively associated with loan borrower’s 
carbon emission. Banks not only apply a higher overall cost of loan to more carbon-intensive firms, 
but also charge a higher fee. 
7.2. Further analysis: Propensity score matching method 
In the main tests, when examining the relationship between carbon emission and loan 
contracting terms, we control for a menu of loan-level, firm-level, and country/region-level 
characteristic variables that may also influence bank loans. To highlight carbon emission’s impact, 
comparing firms with different emission levels should be conducted among samples with other 
characteristics as identical as possible. In this section, as an alternative to the standard multivariate 
regression approach, we employ the propensity score matching (PSM) method which is 
specifically designed to create a platform for a comparison between high and low emission levels 
among firms with similar other features. Specifically, we define an indicator variable, 
High_Scope1, which equals one if Scope 1 carbon emission is larger than the third quartile of the 
sample and zero otherwise. Then, we regress High_Scope1 on firm-level variables, including Firm 
Size, Tangibility, Leverage, ROA, Z-score, and Operation Risk. We use the estimated coefficients 
from the first-stage regression to compute the propensity score for each observation. In the next 
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step, we match each observation with High_Scope1 of one with an observation with High_Scope1 
of zero having the closest propensity score within 5% caliper.  
We report the results from Model (1) using this reduced PSM sample in Table 10, with the 
three measures for loan spread, collateral, and total covenants as dependent variables. Comparing 
with the baseline result about Scope 1 carbon emission in the first three columns of Table 4, the 
magnitudes of carbon emission’s coefficients are larger in all model specifications. Scope 1 
emission’s relations with the three loan contracting terms remain positive and statistically 
significant. Overall, the basic result and conclusion still hold in the PSM sample, which helps 
alleviate concerns about possible confounding effects from other characteristic or omitted 
variables when we relate carbon emission to loan terms.      
7.3. Robustness tests 
7.3.1. Country/region representation issue 
As shown in Table 1, the distribution of bank loans across countries and regions is uneven. 
Some countries/regions have just a few observations, while about one-third of the individual loans 
are borrowed by U.S. firms. By the end of our sample period (2014), U.S. has the highest per 
person carbon emissions in the world.29  It is also the largest economy and has a relatively 
developed legal system. Because the prominent feature of carbon emission is its global impact and 
the international reactions, this uneven distribution gives rise to the concern about dominating 
effects from certain countries/regions. We employ the following methods to deal with this potential 
country/region representation problem and report the results in Panels A to E of Table 11.  
First, we delete those countries/regions with less than 10 observations (i.e., Belgium, Chile, 
Colombia, Israel, Malaysia, and Singapore) and re-estimate the relations between Scope 1 carbon 
                                                           
29 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/01/climate/us-biggest-carbon-polluter-in-history-will-it-walk-away-
from-the-paris-climate-deal.html. 
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emission and loan spread, collateral provision, and covenant number. Panel A shows that carbon 
emission is significantly and positively related with these loan terms. Second, we exclude loans 
lent to U.S. firms from the sample and re-conduct the tests of Model (1) in Panel B, and find that 
the results are robust in the cases with collateral and covenants as dependent variables, indicating 
that carbon emission’s general influence on bank loan financing appears to be a global 
phenomenon and not unique to the U.S. Third, we exclude not only U.S. firms, but also Japanese 
firms since they also take a large portion of total loan observations. Panel C shows that the relations 
between Scope 1 carbon emission and the three main loan term variables are all significantly 
positive, consistent with the main results. Fourth, in Panel D, we conduct analyses using loan 
samples only from U.S. firms, and find that the results are generally unchanged except that result 
in the model involving covenants is not statistically significant. Fifth, following Edwards (1992) 
and Chen, Huang, Lobo, and Wang (2016), we employ country/region-observation-weighted 
regression to control for the uneven observation issue. Our results about loan spread and collateral 
requirement reported in Panel E maintain in this case.       
7.3.2. Raw carbon emission values 
In the main tests, we scale carbon emissions divided by total sales of the firm to make the 
emission scale relatively comparable across different firm sizes. In Panel F of Table 11, we show 
that the results generally hold if we use the unadjusted raw carbon emission level (after taking 
natural logarithm) as the independent variable. The coefficients of Scope 1 emission remain to be 
positive for the models involving loan spread, collateral, and covenants, although only statistically 
significant in the first two cases. 
7.3.3. Estimated carbon emission values 
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Our main tests reply on carbon emission data disclosed to the CDP. However, not all firms 
report carbon production data to the CDP. In order to provide evidence for a more comprehensive 
sample, we include the non-reporting firm by estimating their raw emission levels according to the 
GHG emission estimation model of Griffin et al. (2017). The model shows how the GHG emission 
is determined by the industry in which the firm operates, total revenue, capital expenditures, gross 
property, plant and equipment, intangibles, gross margin, and leverage.30 After incorporating these 
estimated emission values into the regressions, we find that the results shown in Panel G are 
generally unchanged, although slightly weaker for the carbon-collateral relation.  
7.3.4. Control for the choice to disclose  
Disclosure to the CDP is voluntary, inducing a potential self-selection bias from firms’ 
decision to disclose carbon emissions (Matsumura et al. 2014). To control for the influence from 
managers’ disclosure choice, we adopt the method from Matsumura et al. (2014) and jointly 
estimate the decision to disclose carbon emissions and the effect of raw carbon emissions on loan 
terms.31 Panel H shows that our main results are not changed by this treatment, suggesting that the 
self-selection bias is unlikely to undermine our analysis.    
8. Conclusion 
Although curbing carbon emissions and fighting climate change have called for global 
attention and actions, international evidence on carbon emission’s impact on economic activities 
is largely lacking in the literature. Using comprehensive datasets covering 33 countries and regions, 
we examine how firms’ carbon emissions affect their loan contracting with banks. We find that 
                                                           
30 For details, refer to Griffin et al. (2017). 
31 The decision to disclose is determined by firm’s environmentally proactive initiative, environmentally damaging 
action, proportion of carbon disclosure firms in an industry, firm size, number of management forecasts, book-to-
market ratio, leverage, institutional holding, foreign sales, EPA mandatory reporting, and lagged CDP disclosure. See 
Matsumura et al. (2014) for more details. 
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banks charge a significantly higher cost of loan and also apply more constraining clauses in lending 
contracts to firms with larger amount of direct carbon emissions, i.e., from the combustion of fossil 
fuel sources owned or controlled by the companies. However, banks do not seem to differentiate 
borrowers with higher or lower levels of indirect carbon emissions, i.e., from the consumption of 
purchased energy sources, in their lending practices. Using the adoptions of new legislations as 
exogenous shocks, we confirm that the changes of carbon emission-related factors cause 
significant changes in bank loan contract terms. 
If the loans are issued by banks with stronger commitment to carbon mitigation, the relation 
between carbon emission and cost of bank loan is more prominent; If the firm-level governance 
on climate change issues is conducted by high-rank managers, carbon emission shows a reduced 
impact on the stringency of loan terms; In countries and regions with high economic growth rates, 
the relation becomes weaker. We also find that more carbon emission is associated with lower 
profitability prospect and higher regulatory and bankruptcy risks, possible channels for carbon risk 
to influence bank loans as proposed by the literature. Stricter loan terms also make firm managers 
more likely to adopt carbon reduction plans, reflecting a real effect of bank lending on firms’ 
emission decisions. 
A number of insights can be inferred from these findings. First, banks as private sector 
players, through their lending activities, impose punishments for companies’ carbon emissions, 
supplementing other forms of penalties from the public sector. These punishments also push firms 
to take actions to reduce emission, thus contributing to the overall efforts of curbing global 
warming. Second, the carbon-limiting mechanism in the private loan market, however, is closely 
related with the public sector’s actions. This is evidenced from the insensitivity of loan terms to 
indirect carbon emissions because such emissions are largely unregulated. In order to let the private 
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sector have teeth, the public sector should have teeth first. Third, banks’ firm stance in combating 
global warming plays a significant role in the loan terms determination, and a firm’s improved 
carbon management strategy helps abate banks’ carbon-risk concerns. Finally, there is a carbon-
growth conflict and countries/regions experiencing faster economic growth host a credit market 
with less discipline on carbon emissions. Our study highlights the importance of carbon-reducing 
management including both the nation-level administration and the company-level governance, as 
well as their interactions, and also points to the challenge to the international community in 
balancing economic growth and environmental improvement.              
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
Name Definition and construction 
Carbon emission variables 
Total Carbon Emission 
Natural logarithm of carbon emission in Scope 1 and Scope 2 in 
metric tonnes scaled by total sales (million US$). Source: CDP. 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 
Natural logarithm of carbon emission in Scope 1 in metric 
tonnes scaled by total sales (million US$). Scope 1 is also 
referred to as direct GHG emission from sources that are owned 
or controlled by the company. Source: CDP. 
Scope 2 Carbon Emission 
Natural logarithm of Scope 2 in metric tonnes, scaled by total 
sales (million US$). Scope 2 is also referred to as indirect GHG 
emission from the consumption of purchased electricity, steam, 
or other sources of energy by the company. Source: CDP. 
Carbon Emission Legislation Index 
The accumulative number of carbon-related laws or regulations 
introduced in a country or region along the timeline in the 
sample period. Source: London School of Economics and 
Political Science 
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/climate-change-laws-
of-the-world). 
Bank loan variables 
Spread 
Natural logarithm of the amount the borrower pays in basis 
points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down. Source: Deal 
Scan. 
Loan Size 
Natural logarithm of the US$ loan amount of the facility in 
million. Source: Deal Scan. 
Loan Maturity 
Natural logarithm of the number of the months to maturity. 
Source: Deal Scan. 
Covenants 
Number of covenants, including general and financial 
covenants. Source: Deal Scan. 
General Covenants Number of general covenants. Source: Deal Scan. 
Financial Covenants Number of financial covenants. Source: Deal Scan. 
Secured 
Indicator variable that equals one if the loan involves collaterals, 
and zero otherwise. Source: Deal Scan. 
Performance Pricing 
Indicator variable that equals one if the loan includes 
performance pricing provisions, and zero otherwise. Source: 
Deal Scan. 
Annual Fee 
Natural logarithm of the number of basis points of a facility 
commitment amount that a borrower is required to pay on an 
annual basis. Source: Deal Scan. 
Firm variables 
Firm Size 
Natural logarithm of total assets (million US$). Source: 
Compustat Global. 
Tangibility 
Gross property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets. 
Source: Compustat Global. 
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Leverage 
Current debt and long-term debt scaled by total assets. Source: 
Compustat Global. 
ROA Pretax income scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat Global. 
Z-score 
Modified Altman (1968) Z-score = (1.2 working capital + 1.4 
retained earnings + 3.3 income before extraordinary items + 
0.999 sales) / total assets. Source: Compustat Global. 
Operation Risk 
The standard deviation of yearly cash flows from operations 
divided by total assets over the past five fiscal years. Source: 
Compustat Global.  
Country/region variables  
Inflation Inflation rate. Source: World Bank. 
Economic Growth GDP growth rate (constant 2010 US$). Source: World Bank. 
GDP 
Natural logarithm of GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$). 
Source: World Bank. 
Common  
Indicator variable that equals one if the legal origin is common 
law, and zero otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
Creditor rights 
Creditor rights index ranging from 0 to 4, with higher values 
indicating greater creditor rights. The index includes the absence 
of automatic stay in reorganization, the requirement for 
creditors’ consent or minimum dividend for a debtor to file for 
reorganization, secured creditors being ranked first in 
reorganization, and the removal of incumbent management upon 
filing for reorganization. Sources: La Porta et al. (1998). 
Variables in cross-sectional test 
Carbon-care Bank 
 
Indicator variable that equals one if the lead bank is one of the 
following banks and zero otherwise: Citigroup Inc., JP Morgan 
Chase, Morgan Stanley, Crédit Agricole, Munich Re, Standard 
Chartered, Swiss Re and HSBC. These banks belong to either 
the Carbon Principles or the Climate Principles. 
Carbon Governance 
An ordinal variable that equals 5 if the highest-level charging 
climate change issues in the firm is board or board committee, 4 
for CEO, 3 for vice-president or other senior managers, 2 for 
department or department managers, 1 for no individual or 
committee, 0 otherwise. Source: CDP. 
Emission Assurance 
Indicator variable that equals one if the carbon emission data are 
assured by a third party, and zero otherwise. Source: CDP. 
High Economic Growth 
Indicator variable that equals one if a country/region’s economic 
growth is higher than the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
Source: World Bank. 
Variables in channel test  
Regulatory Risk 
Indicator variable that equals one if a firm is subject to climate 
change regulation risk, and zero otherwise. Source: CDP. 
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Profitability 
ROA (pretax income scaled by total assets) measured in the year 
t + 1. Source: Compustat Global. 
Bankruptcy Risk 
The probability of bankruptcy based on the hazard model of 
Shumway (2001). 
Variable in PSM test  
High_Scope1 
Indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s Scope 1 carbon 
emission is larger than the third quartile of the sample, and zero 
otherwise. Source: CDP. 
Variables in real effect test  
Carbon Reduction Plan 
Indicator variable that equals one if a firm has carbon emission 
reduction plan in the year t + 1, and zero otherwise. Source: 
CDP. 
Loan Term Strictness 
First component of the PCA of three main loan term variables 
Spread, Secured, and Covenants, with higher values indicating 
stricter loan terms. 
Fixed effect variables  
Industry 
Indicator variable that equals one for each Fama-French 12 
industries, and zero otherwise. Source: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Li
brary/det_12_ind_port.html. 
Year 
Indicator variable that equals one for each calendar year, and 
zero otherwise. 
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Table 1. Cross-country/region distributions of carbon emission and other key variables 
The first three columns report the natural logarithms of carbon emissions as a ratio of total sales (total, Scope 1, 
and Scope 2) averaged over all loans occurring in each country/region of the sample period of 2007-2014. The 
fourth to sixth columns report time-series averages of the annual inflation rate, economic growth rate (i.e., GDP 
growth rate), and the logarithm of GDP per capita (in 2010 US$) for each country/region. A country/region’s 
legal origin is indicated in the seventh column (1 for common law, and 0 otherwise), and its creditor rights index 
(ranging from 0 to 4) is reported in the eighth column. The last column reports the number of loans in each 
country/region. Details about the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Country/Region 
Total 
Carbon 
Emission 
Scope 1 
Carbon 
Emission 
Scope 2 
Carbon 
Emission 
Inflation 
Economic 
Growth 
GDP Common 
Creditor 
Rights 
Freq. 
Australia 5.03  3.91  3.52  0.03  0.03  10.87  1 3 144 
Austria 6.08  5.84  3.95  0.02  0.00  10.77  0 3 20 
Belgium 4.45  3.84  3.39  0.01  0.01  10.70  0 2 7 
Brazil 5.34  5.21  2.45  0.08  0.04  9.36  0 1 22 
Chile 10.75  10.66  12.63  0.09  0.06  9.46  0 2 1 
Colombia 10.17  10.09  8.56  0.06  0.06  8.80  0 0 7 
Denmark 4.14  2.89  3.05  0.02  0.01  10.98  0 3 32 
Finland 4.68  3.93  3.22  0.02  0.00  10.74  0 1 47 
France 4.06  3.06  3.01  0.01  0.01  10.63  0 0 186 
Germany 4.53  3.68  3.28  0.01  0.01  10.68  0 3 179 
Greece 4.12  1.61  4.04  0.00  -0.07  10.04  0 1 1 
Hong Kong 8.15  8.03  3.44  0.02  0.02  10.39  1 4 18 
India 5.62  4.91  3.79  0.06  0.07  7.31  1 2 72 
Ireland 4.14  3.60  2.89  0.00  0.02  10.84  1 1 17 
Israel 5.31  4.16  4.89  0.03  0.04  10.36  1 3 9 
Italy 4.93  4.36  2.07  0.01  -0.01  10.46  0 2 52 
Japan 4.94  3.86  4.03  0.00  0.01  10.72  0 2 805 
Malaysia 4.06  2.27  3.88  0.05  0.05  9.15  1 3 2 
Mexico 8.97  8.77  7.06  0.04  0.00  9.12  0 0 26 
Netherlands 3.93  3.33  2.81  0.01  0.00  10.83  0 3 54 
New Zealand 4.62  3.68  3.72  0.04  0.03  10.46  1 4 20 
Norway 4.66  4.05  2.42  0.02  0.01  11.39  0 2 44 
Portugal 5.51  4.49  3.97  0.01  -0.02  9.98  0 1 16 
Russia 9.21  9.18  5.81  0.07  0.02  9.36  0 2 12 
Singapore 4.73  3.79  3.24  0.00  0.04  10.85  1 3 5 
South Africa 6.53  5.00  6.07  0.06  0.02  8.92  1 3 45 
South Korea 6.03  4.94  5.15  0.01  0.03  10.04  0 3 98 
Spain 4.97  4.09  3.58  0.01  0.00  10.32  0 2 113 
Sweden 4.23  3.34  3.44  0.02  0.02  10.87  0 1 55 
Switzerland 4.25  3.51  3.39  0.00  0.01  11.23  0 1 72 
Turkey 5.27  4.02  4.17  0.08  0.07  9.39  0 2 14 
United Kingdom 3.69  2.74  2.35  0.02  0.02  10.59  1 4 336 
United States 4.59  3.50  3.45  0.02  0.02  10.81  1 1 1,163 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of main testing variables 
Panels A to D report summary statistics of carbon emission variables, bank loan variables, firm-level variables, 
and country/region-level variables, respectively. The statistics are computed from all loans in the full sample. 
Details about the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Panel A: Carbon emission variables 
Variable Mean Std. P25 Median P75 
No. of 
Countries/
Regions 
No. of 
Obs. 
Total Carbon Emission 4.740  2.076  3.206  4.287  6.005  33 3,694 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 3.751  2.594  1.888  3.325  5.684  33 3,694 
Scope 2 Carbon Emission 3.535  1.951  2.387  3.325  4.420  33 3,694 
Panel B: Bank loan variables 
Variable Mean Std. P25 Median P75 
No. of 
Countries/
Regions 
No. of 
Obs. 
Spread 5.054  0.688  4.710  5.017  5.526  23 1,317 
Loan Size 5.056  2.450  3.219  5.676  6.909  33 3,640 
Loan Maturity 3.833  0.642  3.611  4.111  4.111  33 3,640 
Performance Pricing 0.138  0.344  0.000  0.000  0.000  33 3,640 
Secured 0.157  0.364  0.000  0.000  0.000  33 3,640 
Covenants 0.517  1.280  0.000  0.000  0.000  33 3,640 
Panel C: Firm variables 
Variable Mean Std. P25 Median P75 
No. of 
Countries/
Regions 
No. of 
Obs. 
Firm Size 10.640  2.302  8.999  10.280  11.910  33 3,640 
Tangibility 0.640  0.400  0.293  0.605  0.901  33 3,640 
Leverage 0.506  0.145  0.401  0.507  0.617  33 3,640 
ROA 0.062  0.062  0.027  0.053  0.096  33 3,640 
Z-score 2.432  3.345  0.985  1.752  2.585  33 3,640 
Operation Risk 0.046  0.102  0.014  0.023  0.039  33 3,640 
Panel D: Country/region variables 
Variable Mean Std. P25 Median P75 
No. of 
Countries/
Regions 
No. of 
Obs. 
Inflation 0.014  0.018  0.006  0.016  0.020  33 3,640 
Economic Growth 0.016  0.021  0.010  0.017  0.026  33 3,640 
GDP 10.600  0.584  10.620  10.740  10.820  33 3,640 
Common 0.496  0.500  0.000  0.000  1.000  33 3,640 
Creditor Rights 1.866  1.077  1.000  2.000  3.000  33 3,640 
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Table 3. Relation between total carbon emission and bank loan contracting 
The dependent variables Spread, Secured, and Covenants refer to bank loan contracting terms that indicate the 
cost of loan, the existence of collateral provision, and the number of total covenants, respectively. The key 
independent variable is the logarithm of total carbon emission scaled by total sales. Loan-, firm-, and 
country/region-level variables are controlled as in Model (1). Details about the variable definitions are provided 
in the Appendix. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report results from OLS, Logit, and Poisson regressions, respectively. The 
regression coefficients for each independent variable are reported, followed by the robust t- or z-statistics (in the 
parentheses) based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the coefficients for the 
industry and year dummies are not reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Total Carbon Emission 0.041*** 0.087*** 0.065** 
 (3.12) (2.60) (2.30) 
Loan Size -0.168*** -0.133*** 0.042* 
 (-12.08) (-5.03) (1.77) 
Loan Maturity 0.250*** 1.031*** -0.017 
 (6.17) (9.15) (-0.24) 
Performance Pricing -0.118*** -0.478*** 1.208*** 
 (-3.73) (-2.85) (13.60) 
Firm Size -0.034** -0.263*** -0.181*** 
 (-2.44) (-8.38) (-5.20) 
Tangibility -0.323*** -0.950*** -0.255** 
 (-5.62) (-5.81) (-2.29) 
Leverage 0.393*** 0.889** 0.140 
 (2.98) (2.22) (0.59) 
ROA -1.102*** -2.313** -1.557** 
 (-3.55) (-2.30) (-2.31) 
Z-score -0.036** -0.243*** -0.016 
 (-2.15) (-4.07) (-0.70) 
Operation Risk -0.069 -2.094** 2.842*** 
 (-0.26) (-2.36) (4.55) 
Inflation 5.196** 7.546** 1.402 
 (2.41) (1.97) (0.34) 
Economic Growth 2.016 4.229 -9.627 
 (1.03) (1.18) (-1.56) 
GDP 0.089* 0.335** 0.409* 
 (1.88) (2.49) (1.71) 
Common -0.059 0.347** 1.858*** 
 (-0.94) (2.49) (7.83) 
Creditor Rights -0.051*** -0.480*** -0.583*** 
 (-2.60) (-9.32) (-7.90) 
Intercept 3.610*** -4.164** -4.043 
 (5.35) (-2.18) (-1.50) 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 1317 3694 3694 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.390 0.161 0.398 
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Table 4. Relation between Scope 1 or Scope2 carbon emission and bank loan contracting 
The dependent variables Spread, Secured, and Covenants refer to bank loan contracting terms that indicate the 
cost of loan, the existence of collateral provision, and the number of total covenants, respectively. The key 
independent variables are the logarithms of Scope 1 carbon emission and Scope 2 carbon emission, both scaled 
by total sales, in Columns 1-3 and 4-6, respectively. Loan-, firm-, and country/region-level variables are 
controlled as in Model (1). Details about the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Columns 1 & 4, 
2 & 5, and 3 & 6 report results from OLS, Logit, and Poisson regressions, respectively. The regression 
coefficients for each independent variable are reported, followed by the robust t- or z-statistics (in the parentheses) 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry and year 
dummies are not reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Spread Secured Covenants Spread Secured Covenants 
Scope 1 Carbon 0.033*** 0.079*** 0.046**    
 (3.35) (2.98) (2.09)    
Scope 2 Carbon    0.004 -0.044 -0.007 
    (0.35) (-1.22) (-0.29) 
Loan Size -0.168*** -0.136*** 0.041* -0.167*** -0.131*** 0.046* 
 (-12.13) (-5.13) (1.72) (-11.92) (-4.91) (1.94) 
Loan Maturity 0.253*** 1.034*** -0.0120 0.251*** 1.025*** -0.008 
 (6.23) (9.13) (-0.16) (6.21) (9.17) (-0.11) 
Performance Pricing -0.118*** -0.469*** 1.210*** -0.126*** -0.484*** 1.206*** 
 (-3.73) (-2.79) (13.58) (-3.96) (-2.88) (13.61) 
Firm Size -0.036*** -0.266*** -0.182*** -0.035** -0.273*** -0.175*** 
 (-2.59) (-8.46) (-5.23) (-2.50) (-8.71) (-5.08) 
Tangibility -0.307*** -0.940*** -0.218** -0.218*** -0.666*** -0.058 
 (-5.58) (-5.96) (-1.99) (-4.11) (-4.36) (-0.63) 
Leverage 0.360*** 0.857** 0.110 0.332** 0.586 0.070 
 (2.77) (2.15) (0.46) (2.48) (1.45) (0.29) 
ROA -1.112*** -2.380** -1.628** -1.189*** -2.323** -1.660** 
 (-3.58) (-2.36) (-2.42) (-3.81) (-2.27) (-2.42) 
Z-score -0.036** -0.238*** -0.015 -0.037** -0.286*** -0.023 
 (-2.16) (-3.99) (-0.65) (-2.20) (-4.29) (-0.86) 
Operation Risk -0.034 -2.046** 2.906*** 0.049 -1.564* 3.083*** 
 (-0.13) (-2.30) (4.64) (0.19) (-1.74) (5.03) 
Inflation 5.150** 7.525** 1.582 5.160** 7.807** 1.571 
 (2.38) (1.97) (0.38) (2.47) (2.06) (0.38) 
Economic Growth 2.007 3.941 -9.491 1.933 4.867 -8.829 
 (1.03) (1.09) (-1.56) (1.02) (1.36) (-1.47) 
GDP 0.081* 0.331** 0.397* 0.062 0.274** 0.356 
 (1.70) (2.48) (1.67) (1.31) (2.07) (1.51) 
Common -0.056 0.358** 1.862*** -0.066 0.365*** 1.859*** 
 (-0.88) (2.57) (7.90) (-1.06) (2.63) (7.93) 
Creditor Rights -0.052*** -0.481*** -0.586*** -0.054*** -0.497*** -0.588*** 
 (-2.69) (-9.37) (-7.98) (-2.74) (-9.61) (-8.02) 
Intercept 3.772*** -3.964** -3.800 4.075*** -2.745 -3.288 
 (5.59) (-2.11) (-1.42) (6.08) (-1.47) (-1.23) 
Industry/Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Number of 1317 3694 3694 1317 3694 3694 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.390 0.162 0.398 0.383 0.160 0.397 
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Table 5. Exogenous legislative shocks and the carbon-loan relation 
The dependent variables Spread, Secured, and Covenants refer to bank loan contracting terms that indicate the 
cost of loan, the existence of collateral provision, and the number of total covenants, respectively. The key 
independent variables include the logarithm of Scope 1 carbon emission scaled by total sales, Carbon Emission 
Legislation Index defined as the accumulative number of carbon-related laws and regulations introduced in a 
country or region along the timeline in the sample period, and their interaction term. Loan-, firm-, and 
country/region-level variables are controlled as in Model (1). Details about the variable definitions are provided 
in the Appendix. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report results from OLS, Logit, and Poisson regressions, respectively. The 
regression coefficients for each independent variable are reported, followed by the robust t- or z-statistics (in the 
parentheses) based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the coefficients for the 
industry and year dummies are not reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.017* 0.077*** 0.039 
 (1.82) (2.60) (1.13) 
Carbon Emission Legislation Index 0.055*** 0.125*** 0.036 
 (3.40) (3.10) (0.31) 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission*Carbon Emission Legislation Index 0.014*** 0.045*** 0.011 
 (2.80) (3.29) (0.51) 
Loan Size -0.165*** -0.164*** 0.039 
 -16.29) (-5.76) (0.98) 
Loan Maturity 0.227*** 1.124*** -0.009 
 (7.15) (9.91) (-0.09) 
Performance Pricing -0.121*** -0.457*** 1.218*** 
 (-3.69) (-2.87) (9.53) 
Firm Size -0.052*** -0.275*** -0.186*** 
 (-4.12) (-8.17) (-3.07) 
Tangibility -0.296*** -0.944*** -0.168 
 (-5.16) (-5.29) (-0.94) 
Leverage 0.264** 0.979** 0.017 
 (2.25) (2.32) (0.04) 
ROA -0.482 -2.086* -1.475 
 (-1.58) (-1.84) (-1.28) 
Z-score -0.080*** -0.280*** -0.032 
 (-5.31) (-4.78) (-0.71) 
Operation Risk 0.103 -4.389** 3.530 
 (0.22) (-2.31) (1.61) 
Inflation 5.299** 8.060* 1.423 
 (2.44) (1.65) (0.22) 
Economic Growth 1.207 3.308 -9.770 
 (0.68) (0.76) (-0.82) 
GDP -0.042 0.294* 0.269 
 (-0.69) (1.75) (0.71) 
Common -0.098* 0.299** 1.773*** 
 (-1.94) (2.28) (4.55) 
Creditor Rights -0.105*** -0.547*** -0.599*** 
 (-4.81) (-9.10) (-3.45) 
Intercept 5.841*** -3.022 -2.010 
 (7.47) (-1.39) (-0.48) 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 1317 3694 3694 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.402 0.169 0.402 
53 
Table 6. Relation between Scope 1 carbon emission and bank loan contracting: Cross-sectional tests 
The dependent variables Spread, Secured, and Covenants refer to bank loan contracting terms that indicate the 
cost of loan, the existence of collateral provision, and the number of total covenants, respectively. The key 
independent variables are the logarithm of Scope 1 carbon emission scaled by total sales, a firm/bank or 
country/region feature variable, and their interaction term. The feature variable in Panels A to D are the carbon 
caring bank indicator, the firm carbon governance index, the emission reporting assurance indicator, and the 
high economic growth indicator, respectively. Loan-, firm-, and country/region-level variables are controlled as 
in Model (2). Details about the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report 
results from OLS, Logit, and Poisson regressions, respectively. The regression coefficients for each independent 
variable are reported, followed by the robust t- or z-statistics (in the parentheses) based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry and year dummies are not reported. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Carbon-care banks    
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission -0.014 0.012 0.054 
 (-0.65) (0.34) (0.93) 
Carbon-care Bank -0.355*** 0.224 0.710*** 
 (-4.17) (1.08) (3.22) 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission* Carbon-care Bank 0.060*** 0.092** -0.015 
 (2.82) (2.16) (-0.26) 
Loan Size -0.163*** -0.174*** 0.025 
 (-12.14) (-6.16) (1.01) 
Loan Maturity 0.253*** 1.063*** -0.008 
 (6.34) (9.11) (-0.12) 
Performance Pricing -0.099*** -0.519*** 1.155*** 
 (-3.14) (-3.13) (13.19) 
Firm Size -0.033** -0.278*** -0.195*** 
 (-2.31) (-8.66) (-5.41) 
Tangibility -0.309*** -0.909*** -0.183* 
 (-5.71) (-5.71) (-1.66) 
Leverage 0.369*** 0.979** 0.132 
 (2.80) (2.40) (0.56) 
ROA -1.182*** -2.646*** -1.652** 
 (-3.74) (-2.61) (-2.44) 
Z-score -0.032* -0.227*** -0.017 
 (-1.88) (-3.82) (-0.70) 
Operation Risk -0.030 -2.297*** 2.885*** 
 (-0.12) (-2.79) (4.49) 
Inflation 5.676*** 7.348* 2.161 
 (2.67) (1.91) (0.49) 
Economic Growth 1.582 4.759 -10.090 
 (0.80) (1.32) (-1.62) 
GDP 0.097** 0.305** 0.400 
 (2.06) (2.17) (1.61) 
Common -0.041 0.222 1.656*** 
 (-0.66) (1.52) (6.85) 
Creditor Rights -0.063*** -0.423*** -0.513*** 
 (-3.11) (-8.00) (-6.65) 
Intercept 3.829*** -4.392** -3.974 
 (5.76) (-2.31) (-1.41) 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 1317 3694 3694 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.399 0.169 0.404 
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Panel B: Carbon governance    
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.016 0.387*** 0.029 
 (0.53) (3.35) (0.37) 
Carbon Governance -0.042 -0.017 0.015 
 (-1.35) (-0.15) (0.24) 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission* Carbon Governance 0.005 -0.065** 0.002 
 (0.65) (-2.35) (0.13) 
Loan Size -0.128*** -0.131*** 0.039 
 (-8.42) (-4.14) (1.50) 
Loan Maturity 0.223*** 1.093*** 0.099 
 (4.87) (7.54) (1.10) 
Performance Pricing -0.124*** -0.823*** 1.070*** 
 (-3.73) (-3.88) (12.19) 
Firm Size -0.048*** -0.248*** -0.171*** 
 (-2.80) (-6.76) (-4.22) 
Tangibility -0.298*** -1.229*** -0.307** 
 (-4.91) (-6.24) (-2.49) 
Leverage 0.421*** 0.508 0.199 
 (3.01) (1.04) (0.80) 
ROA -1.443*** -3.405*** -2.207*** 
 (-3.86) (-2.81) (-3.51) 
Z-score -0.021 -0.191*** 0.002 
 (-0.95) (-2.98) (0.08) 
Operation Risk 0.002 -6.116*** 3.691*** 
 (0.01) (-4.78) (4.95) 
Inflation 4.490* 10.125** -0.099 
 (1.74) (2.17) (-0.02) 
Economic Growth 1.319 -0.851 -23.987*** 
 (0.51) (-0.16) (-3.53) 
GDP 0.040 0.237 0.488*** 
 (0.69) (1.56) (2.91) 
Common -0.132 0.479*** 2.338*** 
 (-1.63) (2.99) (10.06) 
Creditor Rights -0.034 -0.404*** -0.462*** 
 (-1.37) (-6.63) (-5.57) 
Intercept 5.227*** -4.004* -5.336*** 
 (6.56) (-1.87) (-2.82) 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 1022 2745 2745 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.311 0.178 0.385 
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Panel C: Emission assurance    
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.038*** 0.133*** 0.031 
 (2.68) (2.91) (1.00) 
Emission Assurance -0.024 0.015 0.050 
 (-0.35) (0.06) (0.35) 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission* Emission Assurance -0.010 0.007 -0.008 
 (-0.66) (0.13) (-0.25) 
Loan Size -0.166*** -0.089** 0.017 
 (-9.56) (-2.48) (0.53) 
Loan Maturity 0.221*** 1.427*** 0.131 
 (4.40) (8.38) (1.41) 
Performance Pricing -0.087** -0.694*** 1.210*** 
 (-2.30) (-3.28) (11.62) 
Firm Size -0.045** -0.248*** -0.134*** 
 (-2.54) (-6.06) (-3.38) 
Tangibility -0.287*** -1.231*** -0.293** 
 (-4.13) (-6.12) (-2.07) 
Leverage 0.276* 0.959* 0.558** 
 (1.75) (1.85) (2.01) 
ROA -1.551*** -2.834** -2.210*** 
 (-3.85) (-2.20) (-2.87) 
Z-score -0.020 -0.191*** -0.006 
 (-0.85) (-2.89) (-0.21) 
Operation Risk 0.301 -3.952*** 3.440*** 
 (1.07) (-3.53) (5.21) 
Inflation 7.778** 7.698 0.487 
 (2.35) (1.42) (0.10) 
Economic Growth -1.868 -7.314 -1.263 
 (-0.63) (-1.31) (-0.12) 
GDP 0.073 0.293 0.556*** 
 (0.99) (1.57) (2.98) 
Common -0.094 0.584*** 1.947*** 
 (-1.21) (3.43) (8.66) 
Creditor Rights -0.055** -0.461*** -0.472*** 
 (-2.28) (-6.80) (-5.23) 
Intercept 5.242*** -6.062** -6.804*** 
 (5.51) (-2.42) (-3.27) 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 856 2381 2381 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.333 0.187 0.395 
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Panel D: Economic growth    
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.052*** 0.107*** 0.045** 
 (5.24) (3.53) (2.13) 
High Economic Growth 0.336*** 0.353* -0.711** 
 (3.27) (1.74) (-2.14) 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission* High Economic Growth -0.089*** -0.087* -0.067 
 (-4.23) (-1.92) (-0.86) 
Loan Size -0.170*** -0.138*** 0.046* 
 (-12.79) (-5.21) (1.91) 
Loan Maturity 0.251*** 1.042*** -0.015 
 (6.27) (9.21) (-0.22) 
Performance Pricing -0.119*** -0.462*** 1.199*** 
 (-3.77) (-2.75) (13.57) 
Firm Size -0.032** -0.263*** -0.193*** 
 (-2.32) (-8.39) (-5.66) 
Tangibility -0.310*** -0.955*** -0.224** 
 (-5.62) (-6.03) (-2.06) 
Leverage 0.402*** 0.874** 0.101 
 (3.09) (2.19) (0.43) 
ROA -1.107*** -2.185** -1.595** 
 (-3.48) (-2.19) (-2.36) 
Z-score -0.029* -0.230*** -0.019 
 (-1.65) (-3.97) (-0.81) 
Operation Risk 0.139 -1.863** 2.938*** 
 (0.57) (-2.16) (4.68) 
Inflation 5.923*** 8.188** -0.797 
 (2.86) (2.21) (-0.18) 
GDP 0.078* 0.293** 0.318 
 (1.69) (2.28) (1.43) 
Common -0.0260 0.397*** 1.617*** 
 (-0.40) (2.88) (7.84) 
Creditor Rights -0.051** -0.486*** -0.498*** 
 (-2.39) (-9.14) (-6.00) 
Intercept 3.703*** -3.733** -2.741 
 (5.57) (-2.04) (-1.08) 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 1317 3694 3694 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.401 0.163 0.403 
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Table 7. Relation between Scope 1 carbon emission and bank loan contracting: Channel tests 
The dependent variables in Columns 1, 2, and 3 are the regulatory risk indicator, the profitability measure, and 
the bankruptcy risk measure, respectively. The key independent variable is the logarithm of Scope 1 carbon 
emission scaled by total sales. Loan-, firm-, and country/region-level variables are controlled as in Model (1). 
Details about the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Column 1 reports result from Logit 
regression, and Columns 2 & 3 report results from OLS regressions. The regression coefficients for each 
independent variable are reported, followed by the robust t- or z-statistics (in the parentheses) based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry and year dummies are not 
reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Regulatory Risk Profitability Bankruptcy Risk 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.135*** -0.002** 0.001*** 
 (4.25) (-2.53) (5.30) 
Firm Size 0.136*** -0.001** 0.001*** 
 (4.27) (-2.16) (5.27) 
Tangibility 0.795*** -0.016** 0.002** 
 (3.79) (-2.36) (2.04) 
Leverage 1.352*** 0.017 0.025*** 
 (3.03) (1.37) (8.00) 
ROA -1.173 0.590*** -0.118*** 
 (-1.15) (18.24) (-11.18) 
Operation Risk -4.336 0.101 0.068*** 
 (-0.96) (0.95) (4.05) 
Inflation -0.508 0.060 -0.068*** 
 (-0.12) (0.65) (-3.35) 
GDP -0.157 -0.003 -0.000 
 (-1.30) (-1.17) (-0.22) 
Common 0.020 -0.002 0.002** 
 (0.13) (-0.66) (2.42) 
Creditor Rights 0.299*** -0.002* -0.000 
 (6.07) (-1.70) (-0.48) 
Intercept 1.038 0.073** -0.006 
 (0.69) (2.00) (-0.67) 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 3230 3451 3686 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.279 0.192 0.298 
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Table 8. Real effects of bank lending on carbon emission decision 
The dependent variable is an indicator for a firm’s adoption of carbon reduction plan in the coming year. The 
key independent variables include the logarithm of Scope 1 carbon emission scaled by total sales, Loan Term 
Strictness measured by the first component of the PCA of three loan term variables Spread, Secured, and 
Covenants, and their interaction term. Loan-, firm-, and country/region-level variables are controlled as in Model 
(1). Details about the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The Logit regression coefficients for 
each independent variable are reported, followed by the robust z-statistics (in the parentheses) based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry and year dummies are not 
reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Independent Variable 
Dependent variable 
Carbon Reduction Plan 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.012* 
 (1.65) 
Loan Term Strictness -0.077*** 
 (-3.02) 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission* Loan Term Strictness 0.014** 
 (2.09) 
Loan Size -0.013 
 (-1.32) 
Loan Maturity 0.030 
 (1.11) 
Performance Pricing 0.003 
 (0.09) 
Firm Size 0.027*** 
 (2.65) 
Tangibility 0.043 
 (0.90) 
Leverage 0.012 
 (0.12) 
ROA 0.158 
 (0.70) 
Z-score 0.005 
 (0.81) 
Operation Risk -0.478*** 
 (-2.60) 
Inflation -7.917*** 
 (-4.52) 
Economic Growth 1.269 
 (0.79) 
GDP -0.074* 
 (-1.85) 
Common 0.068* 
 (1.67) 
Creditor Rights 0.028* 
 (1.94) 
Intercept 1.498*** 
 (2.76) 
Industry/Year Included 
Number of Observations 848 
Adjusted R2 0.111 
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Table 9. Relations between Scope 1 carbon emission and other bank loan contracting terms 
The dependent variables General Covenants, Financial Covenants, and Annual Fee refer to bank loan 
contracting terms that indicate the number of general covenants, the number of financial covenants, and the 
annual fee of the loan, respectively. The key independent variable is the logarithm of Scope 1 carbon emission 
scaled by total sales. Loan-, firm-, and country/region-level variables are controlled as in Model (1). Details 
about the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. OLS regression coefficients for each independent 
variable are reported, followed by the robust t-statistics (in the parentheses) based on standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry and year dummies are not reported. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 General Covenants Financial Covenants Annual Fee 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.055** 0.027 0.057*** 
 (2.09) (1.22) (3.03) 
Loan Size 0.113*** 0.022 0.010 
 (3.93) (0.96) (0.55) 
Loan Maturity -0.036 -0.026 0.321*** 
 (-0.51) (-0.38) (4.46) 
Performance Pricing 1.144*** 1.205*** 0.117* 
 (15.09) (15.76) (1.92) 
Firm Size -0.156*** -0.231*** -0.178*** 
 (-4.11) (-8.03) (-5.76) 
Tangibility -0.060 -0.303** -0.284** 
 (-0.41) (-2.32) (-2.49) 
Leverage 0.005 0.172 0.521** 
 (0.02) (0.68) (2.48) 
ROA -1.841*** -1.728*** -2.528*** 
 (-2.92) (-2.94) (-4.10) 
Z-score 0.000 -0.019 -0.008 
 (0.01) (-0.91) (-0.78) 
Operation Risk 0.488 3.457*** -2.115** 
 (0.35) (7.10) (-2.12) 
Inflation 11.60 -0.167 15.77 
 (1.49) (-0.03) (0.91) 
Economic Growth -22.116*** -8.403* 5.621 
 (-3.08) (-1.85) (0.53) 
GDP 0.245 0.274* -1.646*** 
 (1.08) (1.70) (-2.92) 
Common 3.186*** 1.529*** 1.181** 
 (12.55) (10.90) (2.07) 
Creditor Rights -0.923*** -0.496*** 0.926 
 (-11.60) (-11.18) (1.44) 
Intercept -4.253 -2.569 17.342** 
 (-1.60) (-1.34) (2.50) 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 3694 3694 307 
Adjusted R2 0.420 0.316 0.623 
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Table 10. Relation between Scope 1 carbon emission and bank loan contracting: PSM sample 
This table reports regression results from a reduced sample after PSM screening. The dependent variables Spread, 
Secured, and Covenants refer to bank loan contracting terms that indicate the cost of loan, the existence of 
collateral provision, and the number of total covenants, respectively. The key independent variable is the 
logarithm of Scope 1 carbon emission scaled by total sales. Loan-, firm-, and country/region-level variables are 
controlled as in Model (1). The PSM method is described in the text, and details about the variable definitions 
are provided in the Appendix. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report results from OLS, Logit, and Poisson regressions, 
respectively. The regression coefficients for each independent variable are reported, followed by the robust t- or 
z-statistics (in the parentheses) based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the 
coefficients for the industry and year dummies are not reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.172*** 0.458** 0.273* 
 (2.78) (2.15) (1.76) 
Loan Size -0.157*** -0.0340 0.107* 
 (-7.02) (-0.62) (1.70) 
Loan Maturity 0.170* 0.636*** -0.232** 
 (1.83) (3.62) (-2.23) 
Performance Pricing -0.000 -0.428 0.901*** 
 (-0.01) (-1.18) (6.20) 
Firm Size -0.025 -0.357*** -0.144** 
 (-0.96) (-5.64) (-2.53) 
Tangibility -0.516*** -0.909*** 0.064 
 (-5.06) (-2.89) (0.39) 
Leverage 0.484* 2.219** 0.417 
 (1.67) (2.57) (0.72) 
ROA -0.986 1.501 -1.811** 
 (-1.62) (0.65) (-2.03) 
Z-score -0.021 -0.361** -0.074** 
 (-1.25) (-2.40) (-2.04) 
Operation Risk 0.078 -9.129*** 6.144*** 
 (0.21) (-2.95) (5.63) 
Inflation 4.618 -2.589 13.578* 
 (1.43) (-0.38) (1.70) 
Economic Growth 4.584 8.947 -26.097*** 
 (1.34) (1.43) (-3.47) 
GDP 0.073 0.304 0.012 
 (1.20) (1.17) (0.06) 
Common -0.053 0.106 2.573*** 
 (-0.45) (0.40) (7.19) 
Creditor Rights -0.116*** -0.372*** -0.918*** 
 (-3.27) (-3.25) (-5.31) 
Intercept 3.278*** -19.514*** 0.426 
 (3.29) (-5.50) (0.16) 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 407 1252 1252 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.369 0.201 0.453 
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Table 11. Robustness checks 
Panels A to D report regression results from samples excluding countries with less than 10 loan observations, 
excluding loans from U.S. firms; excluding loans from U.S. and Japanese firms; and excluding non-U.S. firm 
loans, respectively. Panel E reports country/region-observation-weighted regression result. Panels F and G report 
regression results based on raw carbon emission values unscaled by sales and raw estimated carbon emission 
values estimated following Griffin et al. (2017), respectively. Panel H reports result after controlling for potential 
self-selection bias in managers’ decision to disclose emission data to the CDP, following Matsumura et al. (2014). 
In all panels, the dependent variables Spread, Secured, and Covenants refer to bank loan contracting terms that 
indicate the cost of loan, the existence of collateral provision, and the number of total covenants, respectively. 
The key independent variables are the logarithms of Scope 1 carbon emissions scaled by total sales in Panels A 
to E, the logarithms of Scope 1 emissions unadjusted by total sales in Panels F and H, and the logarithm of 
unadjusted Scope 1 emission estimated following Griffin et al. (2017) in Panel G. Loan-, firm-, and 
country/region-level variables are controlled as in Model (1). The emission estimation and self-selection 
correction methods are described in the text. Details about the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 report results from OLS, Logit, and Poisson regressions, respectively. The regression 
coefficients for each independent variable are reported, followed by the robust t- or z-statistics (in the parentheses) 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the coefficients for the industry and year 
dummies are not reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Drop countries/regions with less than 10 loan observations 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.033*** 0.082*** 0.042* 
 (3.35) (3.12) (1.94) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 1315 3662 3662 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.389 0.161 0.404 
Panel B: Drop firm loans from the U.S. 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission -0.022 0.093*** 0.248*** 
 (-1.23) (2.93) (4.64) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 411 2531 2531 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.414 0.187 0.297 
Panel C: Drop firm loans from the U.S. and Japan 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.079** 0.118*** 0.275*** 
 (2.41) (3.22) (4.73) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 390 1726 1726 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.484 0.207 0.291 
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Panel D: Keep firm loans from the U.S. only 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.058*** 0.351*** 0.026 
 (5.54) (4.75) (1.05) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 906 1163 1163 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.434 0.291 0.193 
Panel E: Country/region-observation-weighted regression 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.040*** 0.128*** 0.034 
 (4.11) (2.85) (1.44) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 1317 3694 3694 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.412 0.266 0.399 
Panel F: Raw Scope 1 carbon emission 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Raw Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.033*** 0.134*** 0.021 
 (3.56) (4.73) (0.87) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 1317 3694 3694 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.390 0.168 0.397 
Panel G: Estimated Scope 1 carbon emission 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Estimated Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.051*** 0.049 0.052* 
 (3.03) (0.93) (1.87) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 1613 4556 4556 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.411 0.161 0.412 
Panel H: Control for the choice to disclose carbon emission 
 Dependent Variable 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Secured Covenants 
Raw Scope 1 Carbon Emission 0.035*** 0.120*** 0.045** 
 (3.13) (3.79) (1.96) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Industry/Year Included Included Included 
Number of Observations 1273 3607 3607 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.414 0.202 0.413 
  
 
